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V. CONCLUSIONS ........................................ 283
Disclosure of estimates and opinions, which are often referred to as "soft informa-
tion,"' has presented a number of difficult issues to courts, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and companies issuing offering materials or required to file periodic
reports with the SEC. Although this type of information often consists of projections,
historical financial statements also include this type of information to varying degrees.
For example, a bank's statement of financial position requires specification of loan loss
reserves and is therefore dependent on an assessment of future events (the timing and
extent of repayment).' Similarly, determination of the timing of a write-off of develop-
ment costs will depend on the expectation of future sales.' The disclosure issues raised
by this type of information include the extent to which a company is permitted or even
required to disclose this information and the scope of any liability arising from dissemi-
nation of the estimate or opinion.4
1. The term "soft information" is defined in Victor Brdney, A Note on Materiality and Soft Informa-
tion Under the Federal Securities Laws, 75 VA. L. REV. 723 (1989), as:
(1) information that offers an explicit internal estimate of a corporation's future perfor-
mance-e.g., projections of earnings, revenues, sales, or stock prices-which, if disclosed,
would provide the public investor with the estimates of specially knowledgeable experts, and
thus relieve the investor of the need to rely solely upon his or her own inferences about the
future from such underlying data as are publicly available; (2) information that offers estimates
of the present value of illiquid assets, e.g., appraisals which, if disclosed, would provide the
public investor with specially knowledgeable expert inferences drawn from internal corporate
information about the price to be received if the asset were sold, and thus relieve the investor
of the need to rely solely upon his or her own inferences from available public information;
and (3) information about merger negotiations in which a corporation is involved.
Id. at n.2.
This definition is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. The basis for imposing differing disclosure
obligations with respect to "soft information" is that the information is the product of analysis requiring the
exercise of judgment. Liquidity of an asset may provide an indication of the extent to which estimation of the
asset's value involves judgments. Yet the range of values that knowledgeable individuals would attribute to
some illiquid assets (for example, an interest in a partnership owning government securities) may be relatively
small. Other estimates involving varying degrees of judgment, such as litigation exposure or probabilities of
varying results in material negotiations outside the context of a merger, also are not addressed by this defini-
tion.
Other commentators have noted that all reporting companies possess information spanning a continuum
representing varying degrees of subjectivity, and the distinction between "hard" and "soft" information is the
degree of subjectivity involved. See Bruce A. Hiler, The SEC and the Courts' Approach to Disclosure of Ear-
nings Projections, Asset Appraisals, and Other Soft Information: Old Problems, Changing Views, 46 MD. L.
REv. 1114, 1116 (1987) (defining soft information as "information about a particular issuer or its securities
that inherently involves some subjective analysis or extrapolation, such as projections, estimates, opinions,
motives, or intentions") (citations omitted). See also Homer Kripke, Rule lOb-5 Liability and "Material"
"Facts," 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1061, 1070 (1971) (referring to the examples of allowance for doubtful accounts
and depreciation and stating, "First, we must note that most facts in a registration statement or similar docu-
ment do not represent absolutes, but rather probabilities.").
2. See infra notes 118-26, 191-94, 254 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 41-54, 235-53 and accompanying text.
4. Commentators have increasingly used game theory to analyze whether companies should be permit-
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Under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act),' a company selling
securities in a transaction registered with the SEC (i) pursuant to a registration state-
ment containing an untrue statement of a material fact or omitting a material fact6 nec-
essary to make the registration statement not misleading7 will be liable, (ii) to any per-
son acquiring the registered security,8 (iii) for damages that exclude any decrease in
value the defendant shows represents other than a decrease arising from the untrue
statement or omission. The company's directors, other persons signing the registration
statement, and the underwriters have a "due diligence" defense.9 However, the issuer
does not have the same defense. Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act provides that persons
offering or selling securities, whether registered or not,'" pursuant to false or mislead-
ing prospectuses are liable to purchasers for the consideration paid less income re-
ceived. The elements of a claim for violation of Rule l0b-5" under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (1934 Act)" in connection with the purchase or sale of securities
ted to disseminate false information. See Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to
the Market, 77 VA. L. REv. 945 (1991); Marcel Kahan, Games, Lies, and Securities Fraud, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 750 (1992). Potential acquisitions often present publicly held companies with conflicting desires not to
disclose certain information to the target or the acquiror in order to maximize benefits received in the acqui-
sition and not to mislead individuals who continually trade in their securities based on publicly available
information. This Article confines its analysis to the relationship between companies and their security hold-
ers.
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
6. Materiality is a mixed question of fact and law, and thus will not be resolved as a matter of law
unless "reasonable minds cannot differ on the question of materiality." TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,
426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976) (quoting Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1129 (4th Cir. 1970)).
7. Sections 11 and 12(2) of the 1933 Act and Rule lOb-5 under the 1934 Act have very similar, but not
identical, standards for the statements and omissions that are actionable. Section 12(2) and Rule lOb-5 refer to
statements "in the light of the circumstances under which they were made," while § II does not contain this
reference. No distinction is drawn in this Article between these two standards.
8. This element requires a plaintiff to prove that the particular securities purchased were issued in, or in
exchange for securities issued in, the registered offering-as opposed to securities of the same class outstand-
ing at the time of the registered offering in question or issued thereafter. Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN,
SECuRrTEs REGULATION 4267 n.180 (1992). Difficulties demonstrating compliance with this element can
require plaintiffs to assert violations of Rule lOb-5. HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL
CORPORATE LAW § 8.09 (1992). See generally Richard Cordero, Annotation, Who May Maintain Action Un-
der § ]](a) of Securities Act of 1933 (15 USCS § 77k(a)) in Connection with False or Misleading Registra-
tion Statements, 111 A.L.R. FED. 83 (1993).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A) (1988).
10. That is, § 12(2) is not limited to registered offerings. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 4198.
11. Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instru-
mentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities
exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact nec-
essary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993).
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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are (i) a material misstatement or omission, (ii) scienter, (iii) damage, and (iv) causa-
tion. 3 Although the Supreme Court has declined to decide whether recklessness would
constitute scienter,14 courts of appeals have generally found recklessness to be ade-
quate. 5 In the context of disclosure of opinions or estimates, it is important to note
that of actions under section 11 or 12(2) of the 1933 Act or Rule lOb-5, only actions
under Rule lOb-5 require proof of scienter. Actions under sections 11 and 12(2) of the
1933 Act provide a defense to those making a reasonable investigation (except for
issuers as to actions under section 11, who do not have that defense). 6
Applying these standards to disclosure of opinions and estimates raises additional
issues. Courts have generally held that disclosure of an opinion or estimate implies a
representation that the opinion or estimate has been formed on a reasonable basis, and
that representation is considered a "fact" within the coverage of sections II and 12(2)
of the 1933 Act and Rule l0b-5.' To decrease the risk that an opinion or estimate
13. Krim v. BancTexas Group, Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1446 n.I 1 (5th Cir. 1993).
14. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 n.12 (1976).
15. E.g., First Interstate Bank of Denver v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 901 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. granted sub
nom. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2927 (1993); Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d
497, 507 (9th Cir. 1992); Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 849 (7th Cir. 1991). The Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Central Bank to consider whether there is an implied right of action for aiding and abet-
ting violations of Rule lOb-5 and whether recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement for claims alleging
aiding and abetting a violation of Rule lOb-5. 62 U.S.L.W. 3028 (U.S. July 20, 1993). Even if the Court
holds that there is no private right of action against aiders and abettors or that intentional misconduct is re-
quired to impose liability on individuals who aid or abet a violation of Rule lOb-5, the set of individuals to
whom the recklessness standard would apply will be large, and the distinction between negligent conduct and
reckless conduct will remain significant to that set of individuals.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A) (1988).
17. See, e.g., In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[P]rojections and
general expressions of optimism may be actionable under the federal securities laws."), cert. denied, 496 U.S.
943 (1990); Isquith v. Middle S. Utils., Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 203 (5th Cir.) ("Courts in the past have consistent-
ly recognized that a defendant does not place itself beyond the reach of the securities laws merely by disclos-
ing information that is predictive in nature."), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926 (1988); Marx v. Computer Sciences
Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir. 1974) ("That a forecast, essentially a prediction, may be regarded as a
'fact' within the meaning of [Rule lob-5 is settled .... ") (citation omitted). Cf. Friedman v. Mohasco Corp.,
929 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding a statement in a press release describing debentures issued in a merg-
er as having a specified value, in the opinion of investment banks, not actionable where there was no evi-
dence that the investment banks were not of that opinion). But see Raab v. General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286,
289 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that disclosing that "[r]egulatory changes ... have created a marketplace for [a
division of the registrant] with an expected annual growth rate of 10% to 30% over the next several years"
was "puffing" and not actionable); Barrios v. Paco Pharmaceutical Servs., Inc., 816 F. Supp. 243, 246, 251
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating with respect to projections, referred to in the placement memorandum "only as a
mathematical illustration of the assumptions", "it is well settled in this and a number of other jurisdictions
that future presentations such as contained in the PPM are not statements of material fact on which an inves-
tor can rely."); Greenberg v. Howtek, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 1181, 1185 (D.N.H. 1992) ("Statements about future
events that are plainly expressions of opinion and not guarantees are not actionable under the federal securi-
ties laws.") (quoting Haft v. Eastland Fin. Corp., 772 F. Supp. 1315, 1320 (D.R.I. 1991)). Similarly, the Su-
preme Court held that a proxy statement relating to a merger in which the board stated that it approved the
merger because it permitted shareholders to achieve a "high" value and a "fair" price can be materially mis-
leading under Rule 14a-9 under the 1934 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1990), if the statement was made
knowing its falsity. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, I11 S. Ct. 2749, 2759-60 (1991). Courts have held
that the test of materiality under the various federal securities laws is the same. See, e.g., Flamm v. Eberstadt,
[Winter
HeinOnline  -- 19 J. Corp. L. 246 1993-1994
The Bespeaks Caution Doctrine
made with a reasonable basis will become actionable after it is disseminated solely
because the future proves it to be inaccurate, both the courts and the SEC have promul-
gated doctrines that limit liability for this type of disclosure.'" The SEC has created a
safe harbor from liability under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act for certain projections
filed with the SEC. 9 Courts have addressed liability for disclosure of opinions or esti-
mates that are not within that safe harbor, such as statements not made in documents
filed with the SEC and opinions or estimates concerning matters not within the scope of
the safe harbor. Some of those courts have developed a separate doctrine under which
companies will not be held liable under those laws for disclosure that "bespeaks cau-
tion."
Some of the issues addressed in the SEC's adoption of the safe harbor also arise
in an analysis of the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine. In Part I of this Article, the history of
the SEC's adoption of that safe harbor is briefly reviewed. Part II of this Article chro-
nologically reviews the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine as it has been discussed by the
courts of appeals for the circuits that have considered the doctrine. Selected district
court cases in those circuits are also discussed. The effect of the safe harbor and the
Bespeaks Caution Doctrine are affected by courts' application of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b), which requires fraud to be pled with particularity. Part III of this Arti-
cle briefly summarizes the application of that rule in cases concerning disclosure of
estimates or opinions. The impact of the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine is then further
analyzed in Part IV of this Article.
I. THE SAFE HARBOR FOR PROJECTIONS-RULE 175 UNDER THE 1933 ACT AND
RULE 3B-6 UNDER THE 1934 ACT
The extent to which forward-looking information and other estimates and opinions
may be disclosed in documents required to be filed with the SEC, or are required to be
disclosed in those documents, has been evolving since the SEC revisited its longstand-
ing policy.' This policy prohibited inclusion of projections in those documents through
814 F.2d 1169, 1174 (7th Cir.) ("[LLike every other court of appeals we have taken the definition [of material-
ity] in TSC as suitable for the term wherever it appears in securities law."), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 853 (1987).
18. The truthfulness of a statement under the federal securities laws is to be judged as of the time it is
made. Pommer v. Medtest Corp., 961 F.2d 620, 623 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The securities laws approach matters
from an ex ante perspective: just as a statement true when made does not become fraudulent because things
unexpectedly go wrong, so a statement materially false when made does not become acceptable because it
happens to come true."). Nevertheless, if estimates or opinions prove to be substantially different from the
actual events, the circumstances may support an inference that the estimates were fraudulent when made. See,
e.g., Ouaknine v. MacFarlane, 897 F.2d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1990) ("It is difficult to imagine how such events
could have occurred if the defendants who controlled them had not actually intended to defraud."). Similarly,
that an issuer is unable to make the first interest payment on bonds sold in a registered offering suggests
careful scrutiny of the prospectus is warranted. However, a court dismissed federal securities law claims in
such a case. In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 814 F. Supp. 850, 855, 873 (N.D. Cal. 1993). See infra
notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
19. The promulgation of the safe harbor has not prompted dissemination of projections in documents
filed with the SEC by substantial numbers of companies. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 635.
20. The history of the SEC's developing views on disclosure of this type of information has been exten-
sively reviewed by a number of commentators and in court opinions. See, e.g., Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note
1994]
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at least February 1973.2" On April 28, 1975, the SEC issued a detailed set of proposed
rules for the disclosure of projections.2 Those proposed rules would have required that
any projections released to any person be filed with the SEC and thus made available to
all investors.23 The proposed rules also would have provided a safe harbor for projec-
tions of revenues, net income, or earnings per share prepared in good faith and with a
reasonable basis by companies that had been subject to the reporting requirements for
three years.
On April 23, 1976, the SEC withdrew these proposals based on the number of
technical issues raised in comments received by the SEC.' However, based on the
SEC's understanding that investors wanted to be advised of management's projections,
the SEC published proposed guides under which the Division of Corporation Finance
would review economic projections in documents filed with the SEC, without encourag-
ing or discouraging dissemination of projections.' In November 1977, the Report of
the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the SEC, which addressed projec-
tions among other matters, was released. 6 On November 7, 1978, the SEC decided to
8, at 622-39; Hiler, supra note 1; Janet E. Kerr, A Walk Through the Circuits: The Duty to Disclose Soft
Information, 46 MD. L. REV. 1071 (1987); John M. Olivieri, Note, Liability for Forward-Looking Statements:
The Securities and Exchange Commission's Ambiguous Stance, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L.R. 221, 222-24; Walker
v. Action Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 703, 707-09 (4th Cir. 1986) (reviewing the history of disclosure of soft infor-
mation and the requirements in various circuits to disclose soft information), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065,
reh'g denied, 480 U.S. 926 (1987); Isquith v. Middle S. Utils., Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 203-06; Wielgos v. Com-
monwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509. 514-15 (7th Cir. 1989) (discussing the history and the rationale under-
lying the safe harbor).
21. Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Securities Act Release No. 5362, 38 Fed.
Reg. 7220 (1973). In that release, the SEC recognized the importance investors place on management's pro-
jections, expressed its concern that projections were at that time being disseminated on a limited basis, with-
out access to all investors, and stated general propositions that would be incorporated in rules and releases to
be issued in the future by the Division of Corporation Finance.
22. Future Economic Performance, Securities Act Release No. 5581, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,316 (1975).
23. There were limited exceptions such as projections furnished to commercial lenders and furnished in
preliminary acquisition negotiations. Id. That disclosure of projections is made to commercial lenders should
not require their inclusion in a contemporaneous registration statement was recently recognized by a case in
the Ninth Circuit. In re Lyondell Petrochemical Co. Sec. Litig., 984 F.2d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 1993).
24. Proposed Guides for Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 5699, 41 Fed. Reg. 19,986 (1976). Virtually all comments received by the SEC were in opposition
to the proposed rules, which the comments contended would inhibit disclosure of projections. Guides for
Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Securities Act Release No. 5992, 43 Fed. Reg.
53,246, 53,247 (1978).
25. Securities Act Release No. 5699, 41 Fed. Reg. 19,986 (1976). The proposed guides: (i) provided that
management must have a reasonable basis for the projections; (ii) provided that the projections could be ac-
companied by an independent review; (iii) indicated that traditionally projections were given for revenues, net
income, and earnings per share, and while extraordinary items might require selection of alternative line items,
projections of sales without an income measure would normally be inappropriate; (iv) encouraged companies
filing projections to disclose the assumptions or several projections based on varying disclosed assumptions;
(v) stated that management should disclose whether it intended to update the projections; and (vi) stated that
management should consider disclosure of the accuracy of its previous projections. The guides as proposed
did not apply to "tax shelter investments." Id. at 19,987-88.
26. ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, 95TH CONG., IST SEss., HOUSE COMM. ON INTER-
STATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Comm. Print 1977). The report includes a detailed analysis of
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follow the Advisory Committee's recommendation to encourage dissemination of pro-jections by authorizing issuance of final guides of the Division of Corporation Fi-
nance27 and proposing a safe harbor for projections included in documents filed with
the SEC. 2' The guides noted the Division of Corporation Finance's position that dis-
closure of projected revenues without projected income generally would be mislead-
ing." The SEC adopted the final rules creating the safe harbors for projections, Rule
175 under the 1933 Act and Rule 3b-6 under the 1934 Act (collectively, the Safe Har-
bor), on June 25, 1979.0
In general, the Safe Harbor provides that companies will not be liable under either
the 1933 Act or the 1934 Act for forward-looking statements of financial items,
management's plans and objectives, and the underlying assumptions, if the statements
are made in good faith, with a reasonable basis, and made originally in a document
filed with the SEC or reaffirmed in such a document within a reasonable time. Because
courts have applied the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine to disclosure of information of the
type covered by the Safe Harbor, a review of the issues that the SEC addressed when it
adopted the Safe Harbor assists analyzing the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine.
Five aspects of the Safe Harbor deserve mention: (i) the standard applied to the
method in which the forward-looking statements must have been prepared (in good faith
and with a reasonable basis) to be within the Safe Harbor; (ii) the scope of those items
covered by the Safe Harbor; (iii) the party on whom the Safe Harbor places the burden
of proving that the standard has not been met; (iv) that assumptions need not be dis-
closed for the Safe Harbor to apply; and (v) its limitation to documents filed with the
SEC. First, the Safe Harbor makes no distinction between causes of action under the
1933 Act and the 1934 Act. As scienter is an element of private actions under Rule
lob-5 but is not an element of an action under sections 11 and 12(2) of the 1933 Act,
projections prepared without a reasonable basis but not prepared recklessly or with
knowledge of falsity are not actionable under the 1934 Act. The releases proposing and
adopting the Safe Harbor make no reference to the reason for adopting the same level
of culpability with respect to actions under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act. The release
adopting the Safe Harbor notes, however, that a plaintiff who proves that the Safe Har-
the case law concerning the disclosure of estimates and opinions through 1976. Id. at A-330.
27. Securities Act Release No. 5992, 43 Fed. Reg. 53,246. The final guide was substantially identical to
the proposed guide, with the addition of a statement that companies should not discontinue providing projec-
tions without a reasonable basis (unfavorable expectations not being a reasonable basis). Id. at 53,250.
28. Proposed Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Securities Act Release No. 5993, 43 Fed. Reg. 53,251
(1978).
29. Securities Act Release No. 5992, 43 Fed. Reg. at 53,250.
30. Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Securities Act Release No. 6084, 44 Fed. Reg. 38,810 (1979)(codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175, 240.3b-6) (1993)). The SEC's views on disclosure of projections are reiter-
ated in 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b) (1993). Safe harbors for actions under the Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), and the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), were adopted at the same time. 17 C.F.R. §§ 250.103A. 260.0-11(1993). Actions alleging violation of those two acts are substantially less prominent than those alleging viola-
tion of the 1933 Act or the 1934 Act.
Even though the SEC had been considering a safe harbor for years, it considered the adoption of the
Safe Harbor to be an experiment, whose results would be reviewed as experience under the Safe Harbor yield-
ed further insights. Securities Act Release No. 6084, 44 Fed. Reg. at 38,814.
1994]
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bor does not apply to a claim will nevertheless have to meet the other elements of the
cause of action."
Second, the Safe Harbor as originally proposed was limited to financial items; it
did not apply to a management's statements concerning future economic performance or
plans and objectives. In its publication of proposed Division of Corporation Finance
guides for projections in 1976, the SEC expressed its concern that disclosure of project-
ed revenues without an accompanying projection of net income might be misleading.32
The expansion of the Safe Harbor in the adopting release to include other items, such as
capital expenditures and statements of objectives," without requiring disclosure of pro-
jections for specified financial items, reflects certain conclusions. Those conclusions
include an acknowledgement that analysts and others evaluating a reporting company's
financial position and prospects might find useful detailed forward-looking information
relating to discrete aspects of the company as well as broad objectives, even if complete
projections are not disseminated (whether because they are not available or because the
reporting company declines to make them available).' A company releasing incom-
plete forward-looking information within the Safe Harbor would nevertheless be subject
to the requirement that the disclosure, as a whole, not be false or misleading."
Third, as originally proposed, the Safe Harbor placed on the issuer the burden of
proving the projection was prepared in good faith and with a reasonable basis. This
position was premised on a belief that plaintiffs would find a requirement that they
prove absence of a reasonable basis for the projections an "insurmountable" hurdle.'
The SEC placed the burden of proof on plaintiffs when it adopted the Safe Harbor. The
SEC was persuaded by comments arguing that liberal discovery procedures afforded
plaintiffs an adequate ability to meet the burden.3 Thus, the burden of proof was
placed on plaintiffs in reliance on the understanding that plaintiffs would be able to use
the results of discovery to meet this burden.
Fourth, the Safe Harbor as adopted encompasses disclosure of assumptions under-
lying forward-looking disclosure, although the terms of the Safe Harbor do not require
disclosure of the underlying assumptions. However, the SEC noted that the assumptions
may be an important factor in evaluating forward-looking statements, and in certain
cases their disclosure may be necessary for the forward-looking statements not to be
misleading."
31. See Securities Act Release No. 6084, 44 Fed. Reg. at 38,811 n.9 ("If a plaintiff seeking to establish
liability on the basis of a forward looking statement can make such a showing, he and the defendant must still
meet whatever standards are applicable in the circumstances of the particular claim and the relief sought. See,
e.g., sections 12 and 17 of the Securities Act and sections 10, 18 and 20 of the Exchange Act.") (citations
omitted).
32. Securities Act Release No. 5699, 41 Fed. Reg. at 19,987.
33. Securities Act Release No. 6084, 44 Fed. Reg. at 38,812.
34. A reporting company releasing certain forward-looking information might decline to issue complete
forward-looking statements that are available for bona fide reasons, such as concerns of premature disclosure
to competitors. See, e.g., Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 514-15 (7th Cir. 1989).
35. See Securities Act Release No. 5992, 43 Fed. Reg. at 53,248 n.20 ("However, selective projection of
only favorable items may create misleading inferences ....").
36. Securities Act Release No. 6084, 44 Fed. Reg. at 38,811 (1979).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 38,812; accord Isquith v. Middle S. Utils., 847 F.2d 186, 205 n.13 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488
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Fifth, the Safe Harbor applies only to statements made in a document filed39 with
the SEC or reaffirmed in a document filed with the SEC within a reasonable time. This
requirement reflects the SEC's concern that information not required to be disclosed
may nevertheless be important to those investing in securities. Therefore, to encourage
companies to disseminate widely any forward-looking information they release, applica-
tion of the Safe Harbor is conditioned on the statements being made in documents
available to the public through the SEC.'
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE BESPEAKS CAUTION DOCTRINE IN THE
COURTS OF APPEALS
The Bespeaks Caution Doctrine had its origins in a footnote in Pollin v.
Conductron Corporation.4 Pollin involved a shareholder suit alleging that the issuer's
annual reports for 1965 through 1968 and its proxy statement for a 1966 acquisition
were false and misleading. The plaintiff sought relief under section 10(b) of the 1934
Act and Rule lOb-5.42 Conductron acquired the business of McDonnell Aircraft Corp.'s
Electronic Equipment Division, which included the design and manufacture of aircraft
simulators. 43 The proxy statement sent to Conductron's shareholders in respect of the
acquisition noted that the Division had recently been awarded contracts to build three
simulators for a particular series of aircraft, and that "[e]xpected additional contracts for
[simulators for that series of aircraft] will be necessary to recover development and
other start up costs."'  After the acquisition, Conductron's Annual Reports became
progressively more pessimistic as to the company's prospects, and included write-offs
of development costs for these simulators. 45 The plaintiff claimed these reports had
failed to report promptly the anticipated losses and that write-offs of the associated
assets were thus improperly delayed.' In affirming the district court's judgment for the
defendants after a bench trial, the court of appeals stated:
Likewise, fraud is charged with respect to the 1967 Annual Report on the
ground that "anticipated" losses had not, as the report stated, been charged
off, and, further, that the report stated that the results for 1968 were "ex-
pected" to show improvement, and the Company saw a "possibility" of a
break-even soon. The terms thus employed bespeak caution in outlook and
fall far short of the assurances required for a finding of falsity and fraud.
Language of expectation, of anticipation, and of possibilities recognizes the
U.S. 926 (1988).
39. Pursuant to Rule 14a-3(c), annual reports are not considered "filed" with the SEC. 17 C.F.R.§ 240.14a-3(c) (1993). The Safe Harbor therefore includes provisions expressly applying to statements made
in an annual report to shareholders. Securities Act Release No. 6084, 44 Fed. Reg. at 38,813.
40. Securities Act Release No. 6084, 44 Fed. Reg. at 38,813.
41. 552 F.2d 797. 806 n.28 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 857 (1977).
42. Although the complaint alleged violations of both §§ 10(b) and 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78n(a), on appeal plaintiff relied solely on § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Pollin, 552 F.2d at 801 n.5.
43. Id. at 800, 803-04.
44. Id. at 805.
45. Id. at 806-07.
46. Id.
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imponderable influences of complex variables in a fast-changing field.47
In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals held that there was no clear error of
fact in the district court's finding that "there is no substantial basis for the contention
that any of the reports withheld material information or fraudulently minimized losses
which should have been anticipated."4
There are two important aspects of the context in which the court of appeals stated
that disclosure language bespeaking caution cannot underlie an action alleging falsity
and fraud. First, at the time Pollin was decided, the Supreme Court had recently held in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder49 that scienter-intent to deceive, manipulate or de-
fraud-was a required element of any private action under Rule lOb-5. ° In Ernst &
Ernst, the Court expressly deferred consideration of whether recklessness would be
sufficient to constitute scienter for a private action under Rule lOb-5.5 However, the
Pollin court's citation of Ernst & Ernst makes no reference to the possibility that reck-
lessness may be sufficient to constitute scienter for purposes of liability under Rule
lOb-5.52 The opinion notes that allegations of negligence would not be a sufficient
basis for claims under Rule lOb-5; rather, allegations of intent to deceive, manipulate or
defraud were required. 3 Thus, the language in Pollin quoted above may merely be a
reflection of that court's failure to recognize that recklessness is sufficient to constitute
scienter, which is today supported by the weight of authority.'
Second, the procedural posture of the case is significant. The court's holding that
terms bespeaking caution could not be the basis for an action under Rule lOb-5 was in
the context of a finding that no material information was omitted from the relevant
disclosure documents and the losses were not fraudulently minimized. Therefore, to
apply this doctrine to motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), with
respect to claims under Rule 1Ob-5 where scienter has been adequately pled, requires an
extension of Pollin. It would be consistent with Pollin for a court to hold that mislead-
ing statements bespeaking caution are actionable under Rule lOb-5 if there is adequate
factual support for an allegation that the statements were made with reckless disregard
of their falsity.
Relying on the principles of Pollin, the Courts of Appeals for the First, Second,
Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have declined to find liability under Rule lOb-5
or section 11 of the 1933 Act for statements that bespeak caution. The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit has held that statements accompanied by similar disclaimers can-
not form the basis of a cause of action under section 11 of the 1933 Act and Rule lOb-
5. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has declined to apply the Bespeaks
Caution Doctrine where the Safe Harbor was applicable. Some of these opinions have
extended the scope of the protection in some circuits to (i) cases in which recklessness
47. Id. at 806 n.28.
48. Id. at 807.
49. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
50. Id. at 193.
51. Id. at 193 n.12.
52. Pollin, 552 F.2d at 807 n.33.
53. Id.
54. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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(as opposed to intentional fraud) is the express basis of the claim, (ii) cases in which a
determination is made based solely on the pleadings, and (iii) cases in which the alleg-
edly fraudulent statements are increasingly precise. Other circuits have taken a more
restrictive view, with cautionary language merely a factor weighed in determining
whether a statement is false or misleading. The remainder of this Part II reviews those
cases chronologically in the order that the respective circuits first addressed the issue.
A. Second Circuit
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit relied on this aspect of Pollin in
Goldman v. Belden.5" Goldman involved a class action alleging that Sykes Datatronics,
Inc., a reporting company,56 and certain of its officers had "disseminated very positive
forecasts about its operations which were materially misleading."57 In 1982 Sykes had
two principal product lines, one of which was introduced that year. 8 The statements in
question included, among others: (i) language in the letter to shareholders included in
Sykes' 1982 Annual Report that fiscal year 1983 was expected to be a year of strong
growth in sales and earnings; (ii) remarks at the annual shareholders meeting, subse-
quently disseminated to the public, that although Sykes had experienced some competi-
tion with respect to the newly-introduced product line, Sykes expected to be the domi-
nant supplier in the market and was "geared up to do a lot more business than [it did]
last year. And [it was] going to be doing it" and that Sykes was aiming for "40 or 50%
[growth], or better"; and (iii) a reiteration in the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the
first quarter of 1983 that the outlook for growth for fiscal 1983 remained good.59
In holding that the complaint adequately stated a claim with respect to those state-
ments, the court of appeals stated:
The [district] court's conclusion that the Complaint failed to state a claim
because it attacked defendants' "failure to perceive," and therefore faulted
them merely for failing to make accurate predictions, also viewed the Com-
plaint unduly narrowly. While it is true that not all predictions are action-
able and that liability probably should not be imposed on the basis of words
that "bespeak caution," the claim here is that there was no note of caution
in the defendants' statements and that defendants knew caution was warrant-
ed. The Complaint alleged that defendants made a series of very positive
55. 754 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1985).
56. The phrase "reporting company" refers to a company required to file periodic reports with the SEC
pursuant to section 13 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1988), by virtue of having a class of securities
registered under § 12(b) or § 12(g) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(b), (g) (1988), or by virtue of § 15(d)
of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1988), as a result of having sold securities in a registered offering. Sec-
tion 12(b) provides for registration under the 1934 Act of a class of securities registered on a national securi-
ties exchange, either debt or equity, whereas § 12(g) relates to equity securities held of record by 500 persons
or more issued by companies with more than $1 million in total assets. The SEC has exempted from the
registration requirements of § 12(g) companies with total assets not exceeding $5 million (as long as, in the
case of a non-U.S. private issuer, the securities also are not quoted on an inter-dealer quotation system). 17
C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1993).
57. Goldman, 754 F.2d at 1062 (summarizing the complaint).
58. Id.
59. Id. (quoting in part the complaint).
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predictions as to the probable success of [the new product line] without
qualifications, while they knew of the infirmity of the Company's reliance
on [a particular customer] and knew of many flaws in [the new product
line] .... '
Applicability of the Safe Harbor to projections does not require that the projections be
accompanied by language reinforcing that the projections are estimates (and not certain
to occur).6 Inherent in that approach is a belief that individuals receiving projections
will understand that they represent estimates. However, the court did not consider this
line of analysis or try to harmonize its analysis with the Safe Harbor.62 Moreover, an
annual meeting, where the quantitative comments were made, is not a context that facil-
itates dissemination of disclaimers emphasizing that growth goals are not certain to be
met. Nevertheless, the court pointed to the absence of a cautionary tone in holding that
the complaint adequately stated a claim under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, suggesting
that had such disclaimers been included, the statements would not have been actionable.
In Luce v. Edelstein,63 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed,
among other claims under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, a claim that an offering mem-
orandum contained intentional misrepresentations concerning the potential cash and tax
benefits of investing in a partnership that would renovate buildings and convert them
into condominium units.' The district court had dismissed the claims under sec-
tion 10(b) for failure to plead fraud with particularity under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 9(b) and denied leave to amend the complaint.' The court of appeals reversed
the denial of leave to amend the complaint and, as to certain claims, reversed the hold-
ing that the plaintiffs had not pled fraud with particularity. Turning to the merits of
claims under section 10(b) that the offering memorandum contained intentional misrep-
resentations as to potential cash flow and tax benefits, the court stated:
However, the Offering Memorandum made it quite clear that its projections
of potential cash and tax benefits were "necessarily speculative in nature"
and that "[nlo assurance [could] be given that these projections [would] be
realized." Indeed, the Offering Memorandum warned prospective investors
that "[a]ctual results may vary from the predictions and these variations may
be material." We are not inclined to impose liability on the basis of state-
ments that clearly "bespeak caution."'
Again, the court did not consider the framework of the Safe Harbor in determining the
scope of the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine." The language of this holding represents an
extreme position-that disclosure noting that the projections are speculative can prevent
60. Id. at 1068 (citations omitted).
61. The Safe Harbor did not apply to all these statements, as some were not filed with the SEC.
62. The court did not refer to the Safe Harbor.
63. 802 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1986).
64. Id. at 52, 56.
65. Id. at 51. See part III of this Article for a discussion of the application of Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 9(b) to federal securities laws claims.
66. Luce, 802 F.2d at 56.
67. Because the offering was not registered, id. at 52, the Safe Harbor did not apply.
[Winter
HeinOnline  -- 19 J. Corp. L. 254 1993-1994
The Bespeaks Caution Doctrine
liability under Rule lOb-5 even if the projections are misleading and were prepared with
scienter.
The Second Circuit subsequently extended the bespeaks caution doctrine to cases
alleging violation of section 1 1 in L Meyer Pincus & Associates v. Oppenheimer &
Co.," which concerned the offering of shares in a closed-end investment company.'
In that case, the plaintiff alleged, among other claims, that a statement in the summary
of the prospectus that "shares of closed-end investment companies frequently trade at a
discount from or premium to their net asset values" was misleading because such shares
generally trade at a discount, although they occasionally trade at a premium.70 The
court, citing Luce, held that the statement was not actionable because it was followed7'
by a statement that the issuer could not predict whether the shares would trade at a
discount or a premium. The court also focused on a cross-reference to another section
of the prospectus that stated that shares "frequently trade at a discount from net asset
value, but in some cases trade at a premium.7 2
The better reading of Pincus is that the more prominent statement was not mislead-
ing because it was literally correct and any omission was cured by the prominent cross-
reference to the more accurate information. Alternatively, one could read Pincus as
supporting the proposition that (i) the relevant consideration for a purchaser of the
securities in question was whether they would trade, in the future, at a discount to or
premium over net asset value and (ii) the language stating that no prediction was made
as to the future trading prices insulated the issuer from liability for misstatements of
material73 historical information that was not issuer-specific 74 but could nevertheless
68. 936 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1991).
69. Id. at 762-63.
70. Id. at 762.
71. The court noted that disclosure may be actionable if it is not sufficiently prominent. Id. (quoting
Greenapple v. Detroit Edison Co., 618 F.2d 198, 210 (2d Cir. 1980)). The court also gave weight to the state-
ment in the prospectus summary that the statements in that part of the prospectus were qualified by the "more
detailed information" included in the remainder of the document, even though the other information was dif-
ferent but not materially more detailed (only three words longer). Pincus. 936 F.2d at 762-63. See generally
Isquith v. Middle S. Utils., Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 202 (5th Cir.) ("Adequacy of disclosure is a function of posi-
tion, emphasis, and the reasonable anticipation that certain future events will occur." (quoting Smallwood v.
Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926 (1988); Rule 421(a) under the
1933 Act. 17 C.F.R. § 230.421(a) (1993) ("[[Information shall not, however, be set forth in such fashion as to
obscure any of the required information or any information necessary to keep the required information from
being incomplete or misleading."); Rule 411 (a) under the 1933 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 230.411 (a) (1993) ("Where a
summary or outline of the provisions of any document is required in the prospectus, the summary or outline
may incorporate by reference particular items, sections or paragraphs of any exhibit and may be qualified in
its entirety by such reference."). See also Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1120, 1131 (7th Cir. 1993)
("[lun the event statements in sales brochures and the prospectus do not agree, the prospectus wins."). Since
an issuer can eliminate any conflict without incurring any cost (other than the loss of profit from sales to
deceived investors), it is curious that, under Eckstein, an issuer can create an unnecessary conflict and profit
thereby.
72. Pincus, 936 F.2d at 762-63. The district court had dismissed the complaint for failure to plead fraud
with particularity. Id. at 761.
73. Cf. Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 282 (3d Cir.) ("By addressing the quality of a particu-
lar management practice, a defendant declares the subject of its representation to be material to the reasonable
shareholder, and thus is bound to speak truthfully."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992); accord In re Wells
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be an important factor in a purchaser's analysis of the likelihood that the securities
would trade at a discount to net asset value.
The court failed to address the rationale for extending the Bespeaks Caution Doc-
trine to claims alleging violation of section 11 of the 1933 Act, which do not include
scienter as an element of the claim.
B. Fifth Circuit
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit more narrowly interpreted the import of
the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine in Isquith v. Middle South Utilities, Inc." The Fifth
Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant as to
claims alleging that forward-looking statements concerning, among other matters, antici-
pated costs and completion dates for nuclear power plants violated section 10(b) of the
1934 Act and section 11 of the 1933 Act. The court stated that estimates can be action-
able under the federal securities laws. Whether they are actionable depends on the na-
ture of the predictions.76 The court noted:
Most often, whether liability is imposed depends on whether the predictive
Fargo Sec. Litig., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,007, at 98,255 (9th Cir. Dec. 29, 1993).
74. Cases have not settled the extent to which the federal securities laws require companies to disclose in
documents required to be filed with the SEC information that is not company-specific. Compare Raab v.
General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 290-91 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that the issuer had no duty to disclose
that the end of the Cold War might affect the issuer's defense-related business, because that possibility was
commonly known) and Sailor v. Northern States Power Co., [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 97,724, at 97,424 (8th Cir. Sept. 2, 1993) (stating with respect to a utility's failure to disclose information
that a reasonable investor allegedly would have found helpful in evaluating the likelihood that a requested rate
increase would have been approved, "[O]nce a utility has informed investors that it is involved in a regulatory
proceeding, it has no affirmative duty to provide investors with a further summary of the regulatory process.")
and Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 515 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Securities laws require issu-
ers to disclose firm-specific information.") and Acme Propane, Inc. v. Tenexco, Inc., 844 F.2d 1317, 1323-24
(7th Cir. 1988) ("The securities laws require the disclosure of information that is otherwise not in the public
domain. Sellers of securities need not 'disclose' the statutes at large of the states in which they operate, any
more than they have to disclose how the acquisition of oil for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve may affect the
value of a 2% share of an oil well.") (citation omitted) and Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland
Co., 570 F. Supp. 1529, 1542-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (denying the plaintiff-bondholders' motion for summary
judgment on a claim under Rule lOb-5 that the issuer improperly failed to disclose that covenants, which
restricted the redemption of the bonds with the proceeds of indebtedness bearing a lower rate of interest, did
not prevent certain refinancing transactions and therefore provided less protection than was obvious from their
terms) with McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entertainment, Inc., 900 F.2d 576, 580 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating
that a factually accurate description of a put right in a debenture indenture that was triggered by certain events
unless approved by the "Independent Directors" could be found by a jury to be misleading where there were
a number of omissions, including the omission of the statement that "Independent Directors" had no fiduciary
duty to debenture holders), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 2887 (1991) and Item 101(c)(l)(x), Regulation S-K, 17
C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(x) (1993) (requiring disclosure of competitive conditions in the business involved
including, where material, an estimate of the number of competitors and the registrant's competitive position
and identification of the competitors who dominate the industry if they are a small number and known). The
significant question is not whether companies are required to disclose information known to the general pub-
lic, but rather whether companies are required to apply that public information to describe the implications of
that information for their security holders, which may be less obvious.
75. 847 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1988).
76. Id. at 203-04.
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statement was "false" when it was made. The answer to this inquiry, how-
ever, does not turn on whether the prediction in fact proved to be wrong;
instead, falsity is determined by examining the nature of the predic-
tion-with the emphasis on whether the prediction suggested reliability,
bespoke caution, was made in good faith, or had a sound factual or histori-
cal basis."
Unlike the court in Luce, the court in Isquith did not hold that statements that "bespoke
caution," by that fact alone, were not materially false or misleading. Rather, the extent
to which the language of an estimate suggested reliability or was cautious was a factor
in determining whether the statement was materially false or misleading. The Luce court
did not express a distinction between claims under Rule lOb-5 and those under sec-
tion 11 of the 1933 Act. However, the context of some statements bespeaking caution
might evidence negligence (which would satisfy section 11) but not reckless disregard
of the truth of the matter addressed (required for claims under Rule lOb-5).
In Krim v. BancTexas Group, Inc.," the plaintiffs sought relief under both section
I 1 of the 1933 Act and Rule lOb-5 for statements in a prospectus that the issuer was
"hopeful" that a contemplated restructuring would resolve its financial problems." As
to the plaintiffs' claim that the statements were misleading because they were made
without any factual basis, the court stated, "[slimilarly, projections of future perfor-
mance not worded as guarantees are generally not actionable under the federal securities
laws."' This language continues the Fifth Circuit's concentration on the nature of the
language used, suggesting that the statement of hope would not be actionable even if
there were no reasonable basis for the belief. However, that issue was not expressly
addressed, because the plaintiff was unable to present any evidence supporting the alle-
gation.8 '
C. First Circuit
In Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton," the court addressed claims under Rule
lOb-5 that predictions in a prospectus for interests in a partnership engaged in
standardbred horsebreeding were false or misleading. The horsebreeding industry was
entering a recessionary period at the time the interests were offered, although the pre-
dictions included in the prospectus were largely based on historical results that allegedly
had occurred in a dramatically more favorable market. 3
The First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint as to most
of the claims for failure to allege fraud with specificity. The plaintiff claimed that inclu-
77. Id. (citations omitted).
78. 989 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1993) (reviewing a grant of summary judgment after limited discovery).
79. Id. at 1447.
80. Id. at 1446 (citations omitted). This language was quoted with approval in Shushany v. Allwaste,
Inc., 992 F.2d 517, 524 (5th Cir. 1993) (basing its decision, in part, on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)).
81. Krim, 989 F.2d at 1447. As to this claim, the court also made no distinction between causes of ac-
tion under § I 1 and Rule lOb-5, which were both alleged, although the separate elements were identified. Id.
at 1445, 1446 n.11.
82. 929 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1991).
83. Id. at 877.
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sion of optimistic projections based on historical results was misleading when the pro-
spectus did not indicate that the industry was entering a recession. The court stated that
this particular omission could not form the basis of a federal securities law claim as a
matter of law because: (i) the prospectus included detailed information concerning spe-
cific problems facing the industry; and (ii) the prospectus included numerous statements
emphasizing the high risks of an investment, including one statement that it was "im-
possible to predict with any certainty the future economic trend of the Standardbred
industry as a whole."" The court did not rely on or refer to the Safe Harbor, even
though the projections were included in a registration statement.8
Romani's reach may be limited. It is difficult to demonstrate that an issuer has
acted recklessly in preparing projections based on historical information. That conclu-
sion would be even more difficult to support where the historical information becomes
unrepresentative of the future near the time the projections are released.
D. Ninth Circuit
In re Convergent Technologies Securities Litigation" presented the Ninth Circuit
with claims asserting causes of action under both section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and
section 11 of the 1933 Act for cautionary disclosure of opinions. In 1982, Convergent
began finalizing development plans for a new product line to replace its first product, a
computer workstation, which had been first shipped in 1981." In a prospectus dated
March 17, 1983, Convergent disclosed that it was developing the new product line and
was anticipating that it would provide significant performance and price advantages
over the first product line. The prospectus also stated, "[Wihile the Company believes
that the technical risks in the development of these products are well controlled, the
product cost objectives are very aggressive, and there is no assurance that they can be
achieved."' This negative disclosure was repeated in a prospectus issued in August
1983, which also stated that the risks of the new product line related to completion of
the new product line within its specifications and the availability of components."
However, certain negative information was not set forth in these prospectuses. For
example, in February, the project director for the new line noted that "the cost/pricing
structure for [the new product line] would leave the company 'with no profit"' and that
"he did not yet 'know how to achieve' the necessary reductions."' In late March, he
circulated a memorandum, which noted that in a best-case scenario, all sales of the new
product to a major customer' would be at a negative gross margin (i.e., direct cost of
goods sold, without fixed costs, would exceed revenues for the line) through 1983.'
84. Id. at 879.
85. Id. at 876.
86. 948 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1991) (reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
the defendants on all claims).
87. Id. at 509-10.
88. Id. at 510.
89. Id. at 510, 515-16.
90. Id. at 510 (summarizing in part, and quoting in part, an internal memorandum).
91. The customer accounted for approximately one-half of Convergent's total sales. Id. at 512.
92. Id. at 510 & n.l.
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Shortly after the August offering, internal studies confirmed that most configurations of
the new product line were being sold at negative gross margins, and certain configura-
tions were expected to remain at a negative gross margin through at least the second
quarter of 1984.9'
The court held that the disclosure concerning profitability of the new product line
was adequate, affirming the district court's dismissal of claims relating to the failure to
disclose this negative information. The court stated, "Clearly, Convergent's disclosures
warned investors that problems with attaining internal cost objectives could impact the
ultimate profitability of [the new line]."'  The court also stated that Convergent was
not obligated to disclose the internal statements concerning the profitability of the line,
quoting a case questioning whether particular projections based on questionable assump-
tions could be publicly disclosed and noting that Instruction 7 to Item 303(a) of Regula-
tion S-Ksr does not require disclosure of forward-looking information."
Two aspects of this opinion deserve emphasis. First, the court did not articulate
any distinction between events that may or may not occur in the future and facts pres-
ently known that are likely to have some effect in the future (even if the magnitude of
that effect is presently unknown)." For example, as of February, Convergent's pricing
structure would not result in profitable sales of the new product line, and only with
anticipated future cost-cutting would these sales become profitable. However, the court
held that these facts did not have to be disclosed. Second, the case supports the proposi-
tion that disclosure need only identify future risks (and state that there can be no assur-
ance that they won't occur), with articulation of presently known facts facilitating anal-
ysis of the likelihood of the risks not being required.9"
93. Id. at 510-11.
94. Id. at 515.
95. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a).
96. Convergent Technologies, 948 F.2d at 516.
97. The SEC in 1989 addressed this distinction with great insight. Management's Discussion and Analy-
sis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, Securities Act Release No. 6835, 43 SEC Docket (CCH)
1330, 1333 (May 18, 1989). The SEC stated in that release:
The Project results confirm that the distinction between prospective information that is
required to be discussed and voluntary forward-looking disclosure is an area requiring addition-
al attention. This critical distinction is explained in the Concept Release:
Both required disclosure regarding the future impact of presently known trends,
events or uncertainties and optional forward-looking information may involve some
prediction or projection. The distinction between the two rests with the nature of the
prediction required. Required disclosure is based on currently known trends, events, and
uncertainties that are reasonably expected to have material effects, such as: A reduction
in the registrant's product prices; erosion in the registrant's market share; changes in
insurance coverage; or the likely non-renewal of a material contract. In contrast, option-
al forward-looking disclosure involves anticipating a future trend or event or anticipat-
ing a less predictable impact of a known event, trend or uncertainty.
Id.
98. This type of disclosure is likely to be used by companies that have identified a problem that they
would prefer not to disclose. Another example of that disclosure was identified in Brown v. E.F. Hutton
Group, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). In that case, the court held that the identification of risks,
including the statement that "[i]n the event that oil and gas prices fall or do not rise, profit potential may be
limited," adequately warned investors who alleged that those prices needed to rise 33% in order for a repur-
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In re VeriFone Securities Litigation" concerned allegations similar to those ad-
dressed in Convergent Technologies. The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that a prospectus
was materially misleading, because it omitted that the company's sales growth in its
core market segment had slowed substantially, its historical sales channels were show-
ing little growth potential and the company was thus forced to market its products in
new markets, in which the company's sales force had little experience and was meeting
substantial resistance."m The plaintiffs also alleged that the first Quarterly Report on
Form 10-Q filed after the offering failed to disclose that the quarterly sales included
large "one-time" sales, which would not recur.' The court characterized these allega-
tions as requiring the company to make forecasts and affirmed the district court's dis-
missal of the complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b) and 12(b)(6) on the
basis that companies are not required to make forecasts."t The court also stated,
"While [17 C.F.R. §] 229.303(a)(3)(ii) provides that 'known trends or uncertainties' be
disclosed in certain SEC filings, another SEC regulation, which expressly addresses
forecasts, states that forward-looking information need not be disclosed. 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.303(a), Instruction 7.''
The dissent recognized that the essence of the claims was that factual information
known at the time of the offering was not disclosed."° Although many of the para-
graphs of the complaint that set forth the alleged omissions were phrased in the future
tense," the claims concerning selling products in new markets addressed information
that did not involve any prediction or subjective judgment. At the time of the offering,
the registrant allegedly was implementing a plan to sell in new markets and was experi-
encing difficulty. Similarly, disclosure that certain sales were one-time does not inher-
chase right described in a prospectus to be available. Id. at 1198, 1200. It is not appropriate for a disclosure
document to describe a term of a security, and induce readers to believe that the right is material, when the
right has been constructed in a manner that makes its exercise remote.
99. [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,820 (9th Cir. Nov. 17, 1993).
100. Id. at 98,074 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
101. In re VeriFone Sec. Litig., 784 F. Supp. 1471, 1485 (N.D. Cal. 1992), aftfd, [1993 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,820 (9th Cir. Nov. 17, 1993).
102. [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 98,072. The court did not separately discuss the
claim concerning one-time sales in affirming the lower court's opinion.
103. Id. (citation omitted). One district court in the Ninth Circuit curiously held that Item 303(a) of Regu-
lation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a), applies only to Annual Reports on Form 10-K, and does not apply to
prospectuses. Anderson v. Clow, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,807, at 97,989 (S.D.
Cal. Sept. 17, 1993). There is no support for that proposition in the text of the rule.
104. The dissent stated:
The majority holds that these allegations concern only future events. It is true that the facts
complained of, if true, are relevant to predicting [the company's] future performance. However,
that is not surprising. The purpose of a public offering is to persuade investors to bet on a
company's future performance. Future revenue is the ultimate interest of every potential inves-
tor. What the majority overlooks is that it is only after evaluating past and present performance
that investors bet-or decline to bet--on future performance. By focusing solely upon the
portion of each allegation that may inform the reader as to future performance, the majority
ignores the fact that the allegations are founded in the past and the present.
[1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 98,075 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
105. See id. at 98,072.
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ently involve a prediction of the future. In various circumstances, the nature of a
purchaser's demand for a product, e.g., extraordinary capital expenditures that are large
in comparison to prior sales to that customer, or statements made by the purchaser
indicate that the purchase will satisfy the particular customer's requirements for a sub-
stantial length of time. It is such a deviation from historical sales to a particular custom-
er that should have been disclosed. For example, disclosure could take the form that (x)
a specified percentage of the quarter's sales were to one customer, representing a speci-
fied increase over the average quarterly sales to that customer and (y) those sales were
not made pursuant to a long-term contract. That disclosure does not require a predic-
tion. These items are precisely the type of present trends that should be disclosed and
whose omission should be actionable."~
In re Worlds of Wonder Securities Litigation"'° presented an extreme application
of the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine by a district court in the Ninth Circuit. The court held
that the statement in a prospectus "that 'there can be no assurances' that [the
registrant's] existing internal controls would continue to be adequate given the rapid
pace at which the company was growing," was adequate to disclose that the internal
controls were "facing serious problems."'" The disclosure provided no information
permitting analysis of the risk, and therefore should not have been adequate. The court
also held that the registrant need not have disclosed a policy of crediting each
customer's account for subsequent decreases in the sales prices of the goods. The opin-
ion does not explain the scope of the policy (for example, how long it applied to each
sale), but the policy resulted in an adjustment equal to 28% of the prior year's
sales.'" The court stated that the policy "did not pose a foreseeable risk to [the
registrant's] investors," because there was no evidence as of the date of the prospectus
that "[the registrant's] management could have foreseen that [the registrant] would have
to reduce its prices to such an extent.""'
That analysis is not appropriate. Where a company assumes a substantial risk, its
obligation to disclose that fact should not be postponed until the adverse event occurs.
The structure of the regulatory scheme embodied in Regulation S-K supports the con-
clusion that disclosure was required. Item 101 of Regulation S-K expressly requires
disclosure of dependence on a single customer. and the following:
106. Cf. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, Securi-
ties Act Release No. 6835, 43 SEC Docket (CCH) 1330, 1334 (May 18, 1989) (citing reporting companies
that had failed to disclose that their accounting methods would favorably affect present results while adversely
affecting future periods). In Raab v. General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 290 (4th Cir. 1993), the court, relying
on Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991), distinguished estimates of present value from
predictions of future growth, suggesting that the latter may rarely, or never, be actionable. This distinction is
curious, particularly if one considers that estimates of present value may be derived by capitalizing anticipated
revenues, i.e. multiplying anticipated revenues by the reciprocal of an assumed discount rate. See, e.g., In re
Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 373 n.17 (3d Cir. 1993) (considering an appraisal of a ho-
tel/casino that used the capitalization of income method).
107. 814 F. Supp. 850 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (considering defendants' motions for summary judgment).
108. Id. at 865 (quoting in part and paraphrasing in part the prospectus).
109. See id. at 854, 865.
110. Id. at 865.
111. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(vii) (1993).
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practices of the registrant and the industry (respective industries) relating to
working capital items (e.g., where the registrant is required to carry signifi-
cant amounts of inventory to meet rapid delivery requirements of custom-
ers... ; where the registrant provides rights to return merchandise; or
where the registrant has provided extended payment terms to custom-
ers). 112
These requirements reflect a recognition that disclosure of risks assumed is not depen-
dent on the contingency having first occurred before the risks are required to be dis-
closed.
E. Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit considered liability under the federal securities laws for predic-
tions that bespeak caution in Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions Co."' Sinay involved a re-
porting company in the business of manufacturing construction and transportation equip-
ment products, which had "disclosed that its performance during the first three quarters
was 'gratifying,' although it was experiencing a 'normal seasonal decline' in its com-
mercial and residential markets which would last 'into the first quarter of 1989.""'
The company subsequently released similar positive statements. Then, in an interview,
the company's CEO stated that the company "does not quarrel with analysts' earnings
estimates for 1989 in the area of $1.50 to $1.60" but that the company was "counting
on new products to offset a weaker construction market for 1989." The CEO also indi-
cated that there was a lower demand for construction products due to higher interest
rates and that the company's sales in a particular line might decrease if interest rates
did not decline even if unit sales volume remained constant.' The court noted that
the plaintiffs offered no objective evidence that the statements were not made in good
faith based on historical information, stated that "[elconomic projections are not action-
able if they bespeak caution," and held that the cautionary language was sufficient to
warn an investor that the company's future was uncertain."
6
Regarding claims concerning the analysts' estimates, Sinay is a model of the cir-
cumstances in which the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine should be applied if the doctrine is
to be followed at all. First, the reporting company's CEO did not originate the earnings
estimates; he was asked to address estimates made by others. Second, the CEO did not
112. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(vi) (1993). Certain risks may be obviously inherent in a business and
therefore not required to be disclosed. Robbins v. Moore Medical Corp., 788 F. Supp. 179, 184-85 (S.D.N.Y.
1992). That fact should not. however, justify omission of facts permitting assessment of that risk. See general-
ly In re Union Carbide Class Action Sec. Litig., 648 F. Supp. 1322, 1328 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding the failure
to disclose safety defects at a plant producing highly hazardous chemicals immaterial as a matter of law
where steps were being taken to remedy the problems).
There is a presumption that items required to be disclosed by a schedule promulgated by the SEC are
material. Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 972 F.2d 700, 703-04 (6th Cir. 1992) (considering Schedule 13E-
3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100). cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1645 (1993).
113. 948 F.2d 1037 (6th Cir. 1991).
114. Id. at 1039.
115. Id. at 1039-40.
116. Id. at 1040-41.
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unambiguously adopt the analysts' estimates; rather, he said that he did not "quarrel"
with estimates in a certain range, indicating that the estimate may not be precise."7
Third, the statement about earnings for 1989 was accompanied by the identification of
certain general economic factors that would adversely affect the ability of the company
to meet these targets and related them to particular aspects of the company's business.
Fourth, no objective evidence was offered to show that the statements were made in bad
faith or not based on historical information. Fifth, these statements would have fallen
within the Safe Harbor if the earnings estimates had been made in documents filed with
the SEC. In fact, the Safe Harbor would apply to earnings projections phrased in much
less cautionary language and not accompanied by the identification of factors that may
prevent realization of the estimates. Sixth, as the plaintiff alleged violation of sec-
tion 10(b) of the 1934 Act, scienter was a necessary element of the claim.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit revisited the holding of Sinay in Mayer
v. Mylod,"t in the context of alleged misstatements arising from decreasing real estate
values and a lender's corresponding increasing exposure under loans secured by real
estate. In Mayer v. Mylod, the court summarized the plaintiffs' allegations as follows:
Michigan National stated that it intended to have strong financial controls,
intended to strengthen its balance sheet, had no non-performing real-estate
loans, and had implemented a program to improve the quality of its opera-
tions; Michigan National stated that its loan portfolio was "soundly under-
written" and its value was "fairly reflected on the balance sheet;" ... and
Michigan National, in response to a fifty percent decline in the price of its
stock, stated that its non-performing loans did not warrant the decline in
share prices. 19
The complaint alleged:
[D]efendants misrepresented and concealed the deteriorated quality of Mich-
igan National's loan portfolio, intentionally concealed and misrepresented
the likelihood of huge increases in non-performing assets, charge-offs and
loss reserves, and failed to set appropriate loan loss reserve levels on com-
mercial real estate loans. Michigan National's net income, assets and net
worth were materially overstated as a result, and the market prices of Mich-
igan National's publicly-traded securities were artificially inflated .... "
The sole cautionary note in the disclosure identified in the court's opinion was the fact
that the statements were the issuer's intentions and opinions. The court did not refer to
any statements made by the issuer identifying factors that would affect the extent to
which the forward-looking statements could be weighed or evaluated.
117. Under the rules proposed in 1975, ambiguous confirmation of a third party's estimates would have
been treated as projections made by the issuer. Future Economic Performance, Securities Act Release No.
5581, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,316, 20,317 (1975).
118. 988 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1993). The plaintiffs asserted claims under §§ 10(b) and 20(a) of the 1934
Act.
119. Id. at 636-37.
120. Id. at 637 (quoting the amended complaint).
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In reversing the district court's dismissal of the complaint under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court reviewed the holding in Virginia Bankshares v.
Sandberg' and stated:
The court in Virginia Bankshares noted, "publishing accurate facts in a
proxy statement can render a misleading proposition too unimportant to
ground liability," which is similar to the Sinay court's statement that predic-
tions are not actionable if accompanied by words of caution. However, the
court in Virginia Bankshares went on to say "But not every mixture with
the true will neutralize the deceptive. If it would take a financial analyst to
spot the tension between the one and the other, whatever is misleading will
remain materially so, and liability should follow." Therefore, the central
point of Sinay, that a claim is insufficient as a matter of law if optimistic
opinions are coupled with cautionary statements, partially conflicts with
Virginia Bankshares because Virginia Bankshares contemplates a weighing
of the true with the untrue statements in an announcement for liability to
result.
For example, Michigan National's statement that the value of
loans in Michigan National's portfolio is "fairly reflected on the balance
sheet" is similar to the statement in Virginia Bankshares that $42 is a "fair
price" for sale of certain stock.'"
Mayer v. Mylod and Krim are the first two court of appeals decisions addressing
the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine that review the application of Virginia Bankshares'
holding to the doctrine. The language in Virginia Bankshares quoted by the court was
from the portion of the opinion addressing an argument that there should never be lia-
bility for an opinion if the factual basis for the opinion is disclosed.' Virginia
Bankshares does not articulate a standard that the reporting company's disclosure must
meet to avoid liability. The Court in Virginia Bankshares stated that disclosing accurate
facts underlying an opinion could render a false or misleading opinion "too unimportant
to ground liability," but that "[o]nly when the inconsistency would exhaust the mislead-
ing conclusion's capacity to influence the reasonable shareholder would a Section 14(a)
action fail on the element of materiality."'' The Court then found there was insuffi-
cient evidence to "compe[l the jury to find the facial materiality of the misleading
statement neutralized."'2
Mayer stands for the proposition that statements of opinion may be actionable
under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and after Mayer, a false or misleading estimate or
opinion will be actionable in the Sixth Circuit where any cautionary language accompa-
nying the estimate or opinion does not clearly address the inaccurate aspect of the esti-
121. 111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991).
122. Mayer, 988 F.2d at 639-40 (citations omitted).
123. Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2760-61.
124. Id. The test of materiality under § 14(a) of the 1934 Act is the same as that under § II of the 1933
Act and Rule IlOb-5. See supra note 17.
125. Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2761.
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mate or opinion. However, the reference to Virginia Bankshares does not clarify what
cautionary disclosure will suffice, because the statements made in Virginia Bankshares
were allegedly made with knowledge of their falsity." The standard for language
necessary to insulate an issuer from liability for estimates or opinions prepared negli-
gently or recklessly may be lower than that required to neutralize intentional misstate-
ments.
F. Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit relied on the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine in affirming a district
court's grant of summary judgment in Moorhead v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc." In Moorhead, an accounting firm had been hired to review the financial
feasibility of a new retirement center. The final report was attached to the offering
memorandum for municipal bonds whose proceeds were to finance the construction.
The plaintiffs alleged that the accounting firm prepared the study knowing the falsity of,
or with reckless disregard for the validity of, its economic predictions and that the firm
made misrepresentations and omitted material facts."
The study incorporated cautionary language, including the following: "[The ac-
counting firm] believe[s] that the underlying assumptions provide a reasonable basis for
management's forecast. However, some assumptions inevitably will not materialize...;
therefore the actual results achieved during the forecast periods will vary from the fore-
cast and the variations may be material." Additional cautionary language pointed to
various factors as to which assumptions were made and stated that there could be no
assurance that the levels of these factors assumed in making the forecast would be
achieved."2 Although the memorandum summarized the assumptions made," there
was no factual information that would permit a reader to assess independently the rea-
sonableness of the assumptions, such as comparable information with respect to other
retirement centers or any indication of the extent to which the projections were sensitive
to changes in the assumptions.
As to the claims against the accounting firm, the court held, "We agree with the
district court and hold that plaintiffs could not base a federal securities fraud claim on
any misrepresentation or omission in the feasibility study which was addressed by the
repeated, specific warnings of significant risk factors and the disclosures of underlying
factual assumptions also contained therein..... The district court had granted summary
judgment for the defendant, concluding both (i) that there was no material misrepresen-
tation in light of the cautionary language and (ii) that the plaintiffs failed to show that
the defendants acted recklessly or with knowledge of falsity.'32 The court of appeals
based its holding on the disclaimers alone; it did not address the adequacy of any proof
126. Id. at 2756.
127. 949 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1991).
128. Id. at 245.
129. Id. at 246 n.2.
130. id. at 245.
131. Id. at 245-46.
132. Moorhead, 949 F.2d at 245.
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of recklessness.'33
Along with Luce, this case represents an extreme application of the doctrine. If use
of certain assumptions is reckless, disclosure of the assumptions should not prevent
liability where the error in the use of the assumptions is not obvious to individuals
reviewing the estimates.
Although the case was decided four months after Virginia Bankshares, it made no
reference to Virginia Bankshares, leaving uncertain whether that circuit's approach is
affected by Virginia Bankshares.
G. Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit considered the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine in Roots Partner-
ship v. Lands' End, Inc." In that case, Lands' End had publicly stated on a number
of occasions that its "goal" was to earn at least 10% net pre-tax profits over the next
five years commencing with fiscal 1990, while the company had noted that its results in
the current fiscal year (1990) would depend on its sales during the Christmas sea-
son.3  At the times when these statements were made, Lands' End's internal forecasts
for its fiscal 1990 pre-tax profit percentage ranged from 9.38% to 9.9%.'8 The court
declined to hold that the statements of Lands' End's goal were not actionable under the
Bespeaks Caution Doctrine, because "a reasonable investor could have taken them to
imply that [Lands' End] had a reasonable basis for stating that Lands' End's earnings
goal was attainable in fiscal 1990."'' 3 The court distinguished Pollin on the basis that
Pollin, unlike Lands' End, decided materiality on the record and not as a matter of law.
It distinguished Luce because the projections in Luce had been accompanied by dis-
claimers that the projections were "necessarily speculative" and that there was no assur-
ance the projections could be realized, whereas Lands' End's statements "were not
immaterial as a matter of law; instead they implied that defendants had a reasonable
basis for stating that Lands' End's earnings goal was attainable.""
The court then held that the statements, which had been repeated in documents
filed with the SEC, were within the Safe Harbor and that the slight deviation of the
10% five-year goal from the internal forecasts for the first year was inadequate to sup-
port an inference that the goal lacked a reasonable basis." The court did not attempt
to harmonize the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine with the scope of the Safe Harbor. More-
over, the court implied that, under the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine, the statements would
not have been actionable if Lands' End had stated that they were speculative and might
not be achieved.
133. Id. at 245-46.
134. 965 F.2d 1411 (7th Cir. 1992).
135. Id. at 1416-17.
136. Id. at 1414-15.
137. Id. at 1417; see also supra note 117 and accompanying text. But see In re Allergan Inc. Sec. Litig.,
[Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,066, at 98,061 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 1993) ("[The defendant's] state-
ment that the Company 'believed' that sales growth in the mid-teens over the [three to five-year] planning
period' [sic] was an 'achievable goal' or 'objective' was inherently uncertain and plainly not actionable.").
138. Roots Partnership, 965 F.2d at 1417.
139. Id. at 1418.
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H. Third Circuit
The Third Circuit adopted the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine in In re Donald J.
Trump Casino Securities Litigation."4 The plaintiffs were holders of bonds that had
been issued in November 1988 as the primary funding of a hotel/casino, which was
opened in April 1990."4' The prospectus for the bonds acknowledged that funds from
the offering and other sources were to fund interest payments on the bonds for the first
fifteen months. 42 Within three months of the opening of the hotel/casino, the issuer
tentatively proposed to restructure the debt'43 and, later in the year, began negotiating
a restructuring with the bondholders.'"
The prospectus for the bonds stated, "The Partnership believes that funds generated
from the operation of the [hotel/casino] will be sufficient to cover all of its debt service
(interest and principal)."'4 The prospectus identified the following risk factors, among
others: (i) that the first interest payment on the bonds not paid from the initial financing
would occur before the peak season, (ii) that the hotel/casino had no operating history,
(iii) that the hotel/casino had approximately twice the room capacity and casino space
of many existing casinos, and no operator had experience running a casino of that size
in that city, (iv) that some competitors were renovating their facilities, and (v) that
revenue growth was expected to be restrained by the local transportation system.'
The prospectus also stated that there could be no assurance that actual operating results
would meet the disclosed expectations. 4 The plaintiffs alleged that the prospectus
was misleading, because, inter alia, (i) the statement that debt service could be met was
not believed in good faith and supported by a reasonable basis, (ii) the prospectus failed
to state that the casino would be required to win approximately $1.3 million per day if
the casino were to have sufficient cash flow to pay its debts," and (iii) the prospectus
failed to compare the hotel/casino's high debt-equity ratio to those of other casinos. 49
The court stated, "As we see it, 'bespeaks caution' is essentially shorthand for the
well-established principle that a statement or omission must be considered in context, so
that accompanying statements may render it immaterial as a matter of law."' The
court affirmed the dismissal of the claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
140. 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993).
141. Id. at 364-65.
142. Id. at 364.
143. Neil Barsky, Trump to Ask His Bondholders for Debt Relief, WALL ST. J., July 26, 1990, at A3.
144. See Neil Barsky, Bondholders Reject Trump's Exchange Offer, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1990, at A8.
145. Trump, 7 F.3d at 365.
146. Id. at 370. The opinion also noted that the bonds had a stated rate of interest 500 basis points over
the rate of "quality" corporate bonds, suggesting that the price of a security may warn investors that the secu-
rity is risky. Id. at 364. A similar approach was taken by the plaintiffs in In re VeriFone Securities Litigation,
[1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 97,820, at 98,073 n.7 (9th Cir. Nov. 17, 1993), who al-
leged that the price at which stock was sold in an initial public offering was a prediction, because the defen-
dants relied on future prospects in setting the price. That approach seems inconsistent with the notion that the
federal securities laws regulate disclosure and are not merit regulation.
147. Trump, 7 F.3d at 371.
148. Id. at 374.
149. Id. at 375.
150. Id. at 364.
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12(b)(6), holding that "given this extensive yet specific cautionary language, a reason-
able factfinder could not conclude that the inclusion of ... [the statement that the issuer
believed it could meet its debt service] would influence a reasonable investor's invest-
ment decision."'' The court construed Virginia Bankshares' as meaning that
"when the subject of a misrepresentation or omission is such that the accompanying
language does not diminish the importance of the misrepresentation or omission to the
investor, the misrepresentation or omission remains actionable,"'53 and concluded that
its approach was consistent with Virginia Bankshares.
Although the lengthy risk factors seem almost to bury the estimate, and therefore
preclude its being the basis of any action, an alternative perspective indicates that the
prospectus was inadequate. The prospectus properly identified various facts known at
the time the prospectus was issued that a prospective investor might find material in
weighing an investment decision. This disclosure was not required by inclusion of the
opinion concerning the ability to meet debt service. Those risks were material and
should have been included in any event.
However, the issuer went further and released an opinion and thereby became
obligated to assure that the opinion was prepared with a reasonable basis. For the opin-
ion not to have been actionable, either (i) the disclosure must have conveyed that the
opinion was not prepared with a reasonable basis or (ii) there must have been insuffi-
cient evidence to permit an inference that the opinion was not, prepared with a reason-
able basis. The risk factors did not indicate that the opinion was not prepared with a
reasonable basis. Rather, a reader would have concluded that those factors were
weighed in reaching the opinion. The plaintiffs also alleged information that implied
that the opinion did not have a reasonable basis. The plaintiffs alleged that the ho-
tel/casino had to win $1.3 million per day if the debt service were to be met." That
required win was approximately five times the average area casino win,'"5 although
the hotel/casino had only twice the room capacity and casino space of many existing
local casinos."' Although the court correctly stated that "[tihe federal securities laws
do not ordain that the issuer of a security compare itself in myriad ways to its competi-
tors,""5 those competitive comparisons are necessary to permit a critical analysis of
estimates voluntarily disclosed by a company concerning the performance of new opera-
tions. The plaintiffs alleged information that implied that the estimate was based on
very optimistic assumptions, and the prospectus failed to identify the estimate as opti-
mistic and omitted information that would have facilitated investors' understanding of
that fact. In such a context, dismissal of the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) was not warranted.
151. Id. at 369.
152. Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991).
153. Trump, 7 F.3d at 373.
154. Id. at 374.
155. In re Donald I. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 543, 558 n.10 (D.N.J. 1992), ai'd, 7 F.3d
357 (3d Cir. 1993).
156. Trump, 7 F.3d at 370. The prospectus also suggested that casino win per square foot was a relevant
basis for analyzing a hotel/casino, as the prospectus included that measure in another discussion. See id.
157. Id. at 375.
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III. APPLICATION OF THE OBLIGATION TO PLEAD FRAUD WITH PARTICULARITY TO
CLAIMS CONCERNING OPINIONS OR ESTIMATES
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) (Rule 9(b)) provides: "In all averments of
fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with
particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be
averred generally." All circuits have held that this requirement applies to causes of
action alleging violation of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act,"5 8 although its application to
causes of action under section 11 or 12(2) of the 1933 Act, which do not have scienter
as an element, is unresolved.'" Courts have not applied Rule 9(b) uniformly to actions
alleging federal securities law claims. In certain circumstances, the Rule has been ap-
plied in a manner that effectively forecloses any cause of action."s This rule of plead-
ing can have especially harsh consequences for plaintiffs alleging that estimates or
opinions violated the disclosure requirements of federal securities laws.
As applied to complaints alleging violation of the federal securities laws in which
scienter is an element, Rule 9(b) applies to both the allegation that there was a false or
misleading statement and the allegation of scienter. As to the false or misleading state-
ment, the Rule requires that the complaint: (i) specify the statements that are allegedly
false or misleading; (ii) specify which defendant made each allegedly false or mislead-
ing statement (or made the omission); (iii) specify when and where each false or mis-
leading statement was made (or omitted); and (iv) specify the manner in which the
statement (or omission) mislead the plaintiff.'' Where the claims arise from an alleg-
edly false or misleading offering document, identification of the document is adequate
to specify the time and place of the statement as to defendants who are affiliates or
other insiders with respect to the offering in question, and statements in the document
need not be attributed to particular individual defendants." 2 However, false or mis-
leading statements included in a document filed with the SEC may not be charged
158. Robbins v. Moore Medical Corp., 788 F. Supp. 179, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
159. Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 288 (3d Cir.) (holding that where a complaint seeking
relief under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act as well as § 11 or 12(2) of the 1933 Act alleges fraud with respect to
both provisions, Rule 9(b) applies to the 1933 Act claims; reserving the issue of whether Rule 9(b) would
apply if the 1933 Act claims were not grounded in fraud), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992); accord Ander-
son v. Clow, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,807, at 97,990 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 1993);
Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 808 F. Supp. 1037, 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Lucia v. Prospect
Street High Income Portfolio, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 410, 416-17 (D. Mass. 1991); see also In re GlenFed, Inc.
Sec. Litig., II F.3d 843, 850 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[W]hen § II and § 12 claims are grounded in allegations of
fraud... the allegations must meet the requirements of Rule 9(b)."). Shapiro and GlenFed present a trap for
plaintiffs seeking relief under both the 1933 Act and 1934 Act; by incorporating the same set of factual alle-
gations into the separate counts alleging violations of these two acts, a plaintiff may unintentionally impose
on himself or herself unnecessary and unwarranted procedural obstacles for the claims under the 1933 Act.
See also In re AnnTaylor Stores Sec. Litig., 807 F. Supp. 990, 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("Since plaintiffs dis-
avow any claims of fraud or mismanagement in Count I [alleging violation of § 11], it need not comply with
Rule 9(b) ....").
160. William M. Richman et al., The Pleading of Fraud: Rhymes Without Reason, 60 S. CAL. L. REv.
959, 986 (1987) (describing the history of the Rule and noting this application of the Rule).
161. Friedman v. Arizona World Nurseries Ltd. Partnership, 730 F. Supp. 521, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1990),
a.rfd, 927 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1991).
162. Ouaknine v. MacFarlane, 897 F.2d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1990).
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against outside directors who signed the document solely by virtue of their having
signed the document." Where the claims relate to projections, to meet the third ele-
ment of the test, the "plaintiff must plead non-conclusory facts that, if true, would dem-
onstrate that the projections were false when made,"'" which should be equally appli-
cable to claims concerning other opinions or estimates.
With respect to the allegation of scienter, courts have formulated various tests.
These have included that plaintiffs must "'specifically plead those events' which 'give
rise to a strong inference' that defendants had an intent to defraud, knowledge of falsi-
ty, or a reckless disregard for the truth,"'" that scienter can be adequately alleged by
showing a motive and opportunity for committing fraud (for example, sales by insid-
ers'"), and that the plaintiff must "identif[y] circumstances indicating conscious be-
havior by the defendant, though the strength of the circumstantial allegations must be
correspondingly greater."'6 Fraud on a relatively large scale also may sufficiently
suggest that failure to know of the fraud only could have resulted from reckless con-
duct."
In considering these cases, it is important to recognize that the significance of an
improper motive is that it may imply that a defendant had a reason to disseminate inac-
curate information. However, an improper motive is not a required element. There is a
cause of action under Rule 1Ob-5 against a defendant who disseminates materially false
information with knowledge that the information is false even if the defendant derives
no personal benefit from the deception.
Another court collapsed the separate requirements of pleading the falsity of projec-
tions and the required specificity with which scienter must be pled, stating: "[P]laintiffs
need not necessarily allege the specific information at defendants' disposal at the time
the projections were made. However, plaintiffs must accompany their allegations with
facts indicating why the charges against defendants are not baseless and why additional
information lies exclusively within defendants' control."'" A subsequent opinion in
that circuit stated that in securities law actions alleging fraud, the element of scienter
will be adequately pled if the plaintiff alleges a belief that information demonstrating
scienter "lies in defendants' exclusive control" and the plaintiff has "thoroughly investi-
163. See In re U.S. Bioscience Sec. Litig., 806 F. Supp. 1197, 1203 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that the
statements could be charged against outside directors who were knowledgeable in the industry). Cf. Kas v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 1158, 1165 (C.D. Ill. 1992) (holding claims concerning allegedly false and
misleading press releases and periodic reports filed with the SEC were adequately alleged against the defen-
dants by virtue of their position as corporate officers responsible for management decisions).
164. Urbach v. Sayles, 779 F. Supp. 351, 359 (D.N.J. 1991).
165. Griffin v. McNiff, 744 F. Supp. 1237, 1245 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (quoting in part Connecticut National
Bank v. Fluor Corp., 808 F.2d 957, 962 (2d Cir. 1987)), aftd, 996 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1993).
166. See In re United Telecommunications, Inc., Sec. Litig., 781 F. Supp. 696, 703 (D. Kan. 1991).
167. Friedman v. Arizona World Nurseries Ltd. Partnership, 730 F. Supp. 521, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(quoting Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1005 (1988)), afr'd, 927 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1991).
168. In re Leslie Fay Cos., Inc. Sec. Litig., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,031, at 98,363
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 1993) ("On the other hand, when tidal waves of accounting fraud are alleged, it may be
determined that the accountant's failure to discover his client's fraud raises an inference of scienter on the
face of the pleading.").
169. Craftmatic Sec. Litig. v. Kraftsow, 890 F.2d 628, 646 (3d Cir. 1989).
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HeinOnline  -- 19 J. Corp. L. 270 1993-1994
1994] The Bespeaks Caution Doctrine
gated" all public sources for the information before filing the complaint.'
The various approaches summarized above are not exhaustive.' Although courts
have noted that application of Rule 9(b) before discovery to claims alleging federal
securities fraud must be made in a manner that does not permit "sophisticated defraud-
ers" to escape liability," the Rule has nevertheless been applied by some courts in a
manner that effectively prevents plaintiffs from proceeding with proper claims.
The court in Vachon v. BayBanks, Inc.,73 dismissed under Rule 9(b) claims al-
leging that a bank's characterizations of its loan loss reserves in a deteriorating econo-
my as "adequate" and its lending practices as "conservative" and "careful" were false
and misleading where the bank had reserves significantly less than comparable
banks. Concerns underlying Rule 9(b) in the context of a federal securities law suit
include avoidance of strike suits,' guarding a defendant's reputation from baseless
charges of fraud,7 ' and providing a defendant with fair notice of the claims.'"
These rationales are not implicated where the complaint supports a claim that references
to reserves as "adequate" and to lending practices as "conservative" were misleading by
including allegations that competitors had approximately 40% larger reserves."
In In re GlenFed, Inc. Securities Litigation,'" the court weighed the facts alleged
by the plaintiffs and the defendants and concluded that the requirements of Rule 9(b)
had not been met."8 To support an allegation that the defendants' representation that
the company intended to sell three subsidiaries were false, the plaintiffs identified an
internal strategic plan that stated that one subsidiary could not be viably sold.' This
claim was dismissed under Rule 9(b), because "almost contemporaneous" board minutes
170. Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 285 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992).
171. See, e.g., Shushany v. Allwaste, Inc., 992 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir. 1993) ("What constitutes
'particularity' will necessarily differ with the facts of each case and hence the Fifth Circuit has never articulat-
ed the requirements of Rule 9(b) in great detail.") (quoting Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 288
(5th Cir. 1992)). The futility of rationalizing the various approaches is evident from the fact that, as noted by
one group of commentators, different courts reached different conclusions concerning compliance with Rule
9(b) of two identical complaints. Richman et al., supra note 160, at 973 n.80. Cf. In re Leslie Fay Cos., Inc.
Sec. Litig., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 98,031, at 98,361 n.l (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 1993).
172. See, e.g., Craftmatic, 890 F.2d at 645; Ballan v. Upjohn Co., 814 F. Supp. 1375, 1385 (W.D. Mich.
1992).
173. 780 F. Supp. 79 (D. Mass. 1991).
174. Id. at 80-82 (addressing a bank that, in the first quarter of 1990 after making the allegedly mislead-
ing statements, had doubled its loan loss reserves to 51% of its nonperforming loans while most other banks
had set reserves of approximately 70% of nonperforming loans by the Fall of 1989).
175. Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875, 878 (1st Cir. 1991); Richman et al., supra note
160, at 979.
176. O'Brien v. National Property Analysts Partners, 936 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1991); Richman et al.,
supra note 160, at 979.
177. O'Brien, 936 F.2d at 676; Richman et al., supra note 160, at 979.
178. 51% x 1.4 = 71.4%. The variation was even larger from the Fall of 1989 through the first quarter of
1990, when the bank doubled its reserves. Vachon, 780 F.Supp. at 81-82.
179. 11 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1993).
180. Id. at 847-49.
181. Id. at 847. The plaintiffs had been able to review some discovery materials obtained in a derivative
action. Id. at 848.
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discussed expected bids."u The court also dismissed pursuant to Rule 9(b) claims un-
der Rule lOb-5 that the company had falsely represented that the company's asset moni-
toring procedures were adequate, even though the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
did not have current appraisals for some properties."' Such weighing of the evidence
should not be used by a court in considering motions addressing the sufficiency of the
pleadings.
In Mclnnis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., the court dismissed
claims alleging that an accounting firm acted fraudulently in preparing a feasibility
study. The study's results were included in a disclosure document that assumed annual
inflation rates ranging from 9% to 12%, while the rate of inflation for the year immedi-
ately preceding the issuance of the document was 6 .1 %."u Where projections are pre-
pared on the basis of information that is not firm-specific and is more favorable than
the most recent historical information, permitting a plaintiff to proceed with discovery
does not create a large risk of unwarranted suits. These suits could be avoided by dis-
closure of projections prepared on the basis of the most recent historical data or at least
by disclosing a basis for using assumptions other than the most recent historical infor-
mation. Moreover, without discovery, a plaintiff in this circumstance generally will be
unable to become aware of additional facts supporting the allegation that assumptions,
whose use on their face seem unwarranted, were selected with scienter.
Rule 9(b) has also been construed in a manner that requires complaints to identify
in great detail other evidence that may not be customarily available to plaintiffs at the
time the complaint is filed. In Arazie v. Mullane," the plaintiffs alleged that a
company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 30, 1990, was
misleading, as it stated that there could be no assurance that an identified new competi-
tor would not have a long-term adverse effect on the operating results of two of the
company's properties, although an internal memorandum allegedly indicated that in-
creased competition in April 1990 would cause a dramatic decline in revenues.'" The
plaintiffs also alleged that the next Quarterly Report, in which the company stated that
it believed that it would be able to meet debt service payments, was misleading, be-
cause internal memoranda allegedly indicated that the company would be in default
under certain debt covenants." The court held that the requirements of Rule 9(b)
were not met, because the plaintiffs did not state who prepared the memoranda, when
182. Id.
183. Id. at 849.
184. 706 F. Supp. 1355 (M.D. Tenn. 1989).
185. Id. at 1358-59.
186. 2 F.3d 1456 (7th Cir. 1993).
187. Id. at 1462-63.
188. Id. at 1463. The opinion does not clarify the time the default was projected to occur. A projection of
a default occurring a number of years in the future might be too uncertain to be material. However, the
court's failure to address that issue indicates that the timing of the default was not the reason that the claims
were dismissed.
The company's lack of candor was also manifested in a public statement issued in connection with a
stock-for-debt swap commenced in the second quarter of 1990. The company's CEO publicly stated that the
company "chose to use stock rather than cash in the offer.., because it needed cash for various expansion
projects this year." Id. at 1462.
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they were prepared, the firmness of the numbers contained in the memoranda, and the
names of the company's employees who reviewed the memoranda.'
It is appropriate to require plaintiffs to identify in the complaint the statements that
are allegedly misleading, in order to give the defendants notice of the claims against
them. However, Arazie holds that plaintiffs must specify in those terms information
proving that the defendants had knowledge that the Quarterly Reports were false. This
requirement conflicts with the terms of Rule 9(b), which permits knowledge to be
averred generally. The existence of the memoranda"9 surely negates any suggestion
that the action was a strike suit, i.e., that on its face it had no merit. Perhaps the plain-
tiffs, after full discovery and a trial, would have been unable to meet their burden of
demonstrating that the Quarterly Reports were disseminated recklessly or with
knowledge that they were false. The fully developed evidence might have indicated that
the memoranda had been prepared on discredited assumptions or were otherwise proper-
ly disregarded. That possibility does not justify dismissing claims under Rule 9(b) be-
fore the evidence has been fully developed.
Another court declined to require the specificity contemplated by Arazie. In In re
Wells Fargo Securities Litigation,9 the defendants, a bank holding company and
some of its executives, argued that the complaint did not meet the requirements of Rule
9(b). The complaint identified. loans to nine borrowers whose precarious financial posi-
tion allegedly merited an increase in the bank's loan loss reserves."9 The court was
not persuaded by the defendants' argument that the complaint was defective because it
did not identify the principal amount of those loans, the date the loans were extended,
whether the loans were in default, and when the reserves should have been estab-
lished.'" Deciding whether the court's holding is correct requires identification of the
rationale underlying Rule 9(b). If the purpose of Rule 9(b) is to give defendants notice
of the claim, it makes no sense for a court to require a complaint to set forth informa-
tion that is easily accessible to the defendants through a review of their internal finan-
cial records."9
189. Id. at 1467. A similar conclusion was reached in Anderson v. Clow, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 97,807, at 97,993 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 1993), in which the court dismissed under Rule
9(b) claims that misleading projections were released at roadshow presentations. The court stated that the
claims, which named the defendants who allegedly made the improper statements, were "woefully inade-
quate," because the complaint did not specify the time or place of the roadshow presentations. Id. One would
expect that those meetings would be sufficiently prominent in the memories of the participants that alleging
the dates and places of the presentations would not be of any benefit to the defendants.
190. The opinion does not imply that the allegations concerning the contents of the memoranda were
manufactured by the plaintiffs, i.e., that the memoranda did not exist. A naked assertion that a reporting com-
pany had prepared internal memoranda that contradicted information that the company disseminated would
not add support to a claim that the information was misleading and disseminated with scienter.
191. [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 98,007 (9th Cir. Dec. 29, 1993).
192. Id. at 98,252.
193. Id.
194. The plaintiffs' position would have been untenable if the complaint had alleged that reserves should
have been established by identifying loans that represented an immaterial amount of the bank's portfolio or if
the bank had incorporated evidence of the poor quality of the loans in establishing reserves. Those possibili-
ties were not expressly addressed by the court and therefore were not part of the basis of the court's decision.
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In the recent First Circuit case of Greenstone v. Cambex Corporation,'" the court
dismissed claims alleging that Cambex inaccurately disclosed its financial position by
not disclosing certain contingent liabilities." Cambex was in the business of selling
computer boards. The transactions required the customers' old computer boards to be
delivered to Cambex. Some of Cambex's customers did not own, but were merely les-
sees of, the computers in which the customers had installed the new boards. Cambex
quickly settled a suit filed by the lessor arising from Cambex's failure to return the
leased computer boards in some cases and its sublease of the boards in other cases."
The court dismissed the federal securities law claims alleging that Cambex should have
disclosed its potential liability to the lessor, holding that there was an inadequate allega-
tion of facts supporting the conclusion that the company "knew of a significant possibil-
ity of loss. '1"
This decision is extraordinary. The company's failure to investigate this possible
problem in the context of disclosing its financial position is the type of closing one's
eyes to a potential problem that is at the core of the definition of reckless conduct.'"
The court noted that the complaint did not quote the language of the leases.' Failure
to allege the terms of the leases, which might not have been publicly available, should
not have prevented the claim from proceeding to discovery. The fact that the suit with
the lessor was quickly settled for a large amount of money amply supports the inference
that the reporting company's actions violated the leases.
Other courts have applied Rule 9(b) less restrictively. One court held that fraud
was adequately pled where the complaint recited that the defendant had a significant
financial interest in the issuer and participated in the preparation of allegedly misleading
financial projections based on assumptions that the defendant could have readily veri-
fied."° Another court held that the requirements of Rule 9(b) were met where the na-
ture of the alleged misstatements, which included utilization of production capacity and
regulatory problems with the Food and Drug Administration, suggested that the prob-
195. 975 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1992).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 23.
198. Id. at 28. The court declined to decide whether contingent liabilities may be required to be disclosed
under the 1934 Act and Regulation S-K even if they are not required to be disclosed in the financial state-
ments under applicable accounting standards. Id. See generally Management's Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations, Securities Act Release No. 6835, 43 SEC Docket (CCH) 1330,
1335 n.27 (May 18, 1989) ("MD&A mandates disclosure of specified forward-looking information, and speci-
fies its own standard of disclosure-i.e., reasonably likely to have a material effect .... The probabili-
ty/magnitude test for materiality in Basic, Inc., v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988), is inapposite .... ").
199. Consider, for example, whether a company in the business of selling and installing car stereos would
contemplate replacement of the radio in a leased car at the request of the lessee, and sell the removed radio to
a third party, without reviewing the terms of the lease or obtaining the rental agency's approval. Of course, a
lease might give the lessee the right to replace components. However, only by reviewing the lease could the
existence of that power be confirmed.
200. Greenstone, 975 F.2d at 26.
201. The defendant was a sublessor to oil and gas partnerships, the interests in which were sold to the
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs alleged that projections overstated the size and profitability of the oil reserves. The
court stated that as sublessor, the defendant had "ready access to the actual condition of the drilling proper-
ties." Griffin v. McNiff, 744 F. Supp. 1237, 1245-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd, 996 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1993).
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lems were ongoing and therefore must have been known by the company at the time
falsely optimistic statements were made.' A third court held that knowledge of un-
disclosed quality control problems was adequately pled where the defendants had stated
that they had remedied quality control problems in the preceding year.'
The cases summarized above demonstrate the effect Rule 9(b) can have preventing
redress for meritorious allegations concerning estimates or opinions. In addition, appli-
cation of Rule 9(b) to opinions or estimates within the Safe Harbor is inconsistent with
the assumptions underlying the SEC's decision to place the burden of persuasion in the
Safe Harbor on plaintiffs.'
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE BESPEAKS CAUTION DOCTRINE
The discussion set forth in Part II organized the developments in accordance with
the various circuits, which is necessary because the circuits' development of the Be-
speaks Caution Doctrine has not been entirely consistent. However, the issues may be
clarified by noting certain common themes and some related issues. Other aspects of the
Bespeaks Caution Doctrine that, as of this time, have been raised only by opinions of
district courts also merit attention.
A. Disclosure of Predictions and Cautionary Language Discharging the Obligation
to Disclose Other Material Information
Cautionary language of the type considered by courts applying the Bespeaks Cau-
tion Doctrine can perform two functions. The contingent nature of a forward-looking
statement may not be obvious. For example, a statement concerning sales during a
future period could be under contract and therefore very likely to occur. Cautionary
language can confirm that the statement reflects an estimate or opinion. That informa-
tion can be conveyed explicitly by stating that there can be no assurance that the subject
of the estimate or opinion will occur. The information also can be conveyed implicitly
by identifying factors that could make the subject of the estimate or opinion not occur.
In addition, the cautionary language can facilitate analysis of the likelihood that the
estimate or opinion will prove to be correct by stating the assumptions made, identify-
ing events (i.e., risk factors) that might cause the assumptions not to be accurate, and
by providing presently known facts that permit analysis of the likelihood and the magni-
tude of the impact of the events. In such a context, it is proper for a court to hold that
no reasonable investor would have believed that the results predicted in an estimate
were assured.
However, the cases decided by the Courts of Appeals have identified certain cir-
cumstances in which the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine may prevent prosecution of merito-
rious claims. Disclosure of negative material information does not negate the ability of
unreasonably prepared estimates to mislead investors. Unless an opinion or estimate
expressly states that it is based on assumptions that conflict with other, negative infor-
202. Robbins v. Moore Medical Corp., 788 F. Supp. 179, 186, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
203. Steiner v. Unitrode Corp., 834 F. Supp. 40, 43-45 (D. Mass. 1993).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
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mation that has been disclosed, the investing public may properly expect that the nega-
tive information has been considered in the preparation of the estimate or opinion.'
Similarly, disclosure that there can be no assurance that a negative event will not occur
does not satisfy the obligation to disclose material information that would permit inves-
tors to weigh the likelihood of that event.' Courts also must be careful in labeling
information as a prediction. Companies should not succeed in omitting material, factual
information by emphasizing that the information's relevance derives from the extent to
which it facilitates analysis of future events.'
B. Restriction of Bespeaks Caution Doctrine to Financial Information
Statements expressing opinions or estimates concerning a variety of matters can be
helpful to analysts and others valuing securities. Courts considering the scope of the
type of disclosure to which the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine should apply have not pre-
sented compelling reasons for concluding that disclosure of certain types of opinions or
estimates should not be encouraged.
In Ballan v. Upjohn Company,' the defendant had allegedly optimistically de-
scribed the safety and effectiveness of a drug that the defendant manufactured, but the
defendant failed to disclose promptly to either the investing public or the FDA adverse
information concerning the drug.2 9 The court stated: "Reliance, in my judgment, on
Sinay and In re Apple is misplaced because the instant case does not involve a claim
for false economic projection."2 '
Ballan has not provided a compelling basis for distinguishing the actionability of
disclosure of an opinion or estimate based on whether the opinion addresses financial
statement items. The value of an opinion to a person analyzing the value of a security
derives from the extent to which it permits analysis of the financial return from the
security. Therefore, any material opinion or estimate, regardless of its subject matter, is
only relevant to the extent it permits inferences concerning financial information. More-
over, to the extent a financial projection is based on estimates concerning information
such as the safety of a product, it would be anomalous to encourage disclosure of the
financial projection, but not disclosure solely of an underlying opinion. Although it
might be appropriate to exclude certain opinions from the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine if
they were unusually likely to be inaccurate (or were unusually likely to convey an in-
correct sense of precision),'" Ballan did not identify such a basis. A better basis for
reaching the same conclusion in Ballan is that the disclosure of an opinion did not
obviate the need to disclose a material fact bearing on the opinion-the other informa-
tion concerning the drug."'
205. See supra notes 140-57 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 60-62, 86-112, 140-57 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 86-106 and accompanying text.
208. 814 F. Supp. 1375 (W.D. Mich. 1992).
209. Id. at 1379.
210. Id. at 1382.
211. An opinion concerning future results of research in a new technology might be such an area.
212. See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.
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The court in In re Donald J. Trump Casino Securities Litigation213 drew an am-
biguous distinction:
We do note the troubling possibility that the "bespeaks, caution" doc-
trine will encourage management to conceal deliberate misrepresentations
beneath the mantle of broad cautionary language. It is for this reason that
the "bespeaks caution" doctrine applies only to precise cautionary language
which directly addresses itself to future projections, estimates or forecasts in
a prospectus. A blanket warning that the within investment is "risky," for
example, would be insufficient to ward against a federal securities fraud
claim. Nor would our holding here apply to cautionary language regarding
actual facts, such as past performance of an existing investment or the con-
tents of appraisals or other expert reports referenced in the prospectus.""
As noted above,2"' the basis for the doctrine is that liability should not be im-
posed with respect to disclosure derived from the good faith, reasonable exercise of
judgment. This rationale applies to estimates of future performance as well as state-
ments of present financial condition to the extent they represent the exercise of judg-
ment.216 However, as implied by the language in Trump quoted above, the doctrine
should not be applied to estimates or opinions where the company disseminating the
disclosure could have confirmed the disclosure's accuracy but failed to do so.
C. Facts Implying Absence of Good Faith or a Reasonable Basis
The cases considering claims alleging that dissemination of opinions or estimates
violated federal securities laws have presented a number of patterns that suggest the
estimate or opinion was not disseminated in good faith with a reasonable basis. Facts
supporting that an opinion or estimate was not made in good faith include omission of
alternative, less favorable opinions or estimates and a change in an estimate or opinion
to one that is more optimistic coinciding with an increased desirability of optimistic
information."' By disclosing a projection, a reporting company is not only understood
213. 793 F. Supp. 543 (D.N.J. 1992), affd, 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993).
214. Id. at 554.
215. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
216. See generally Brudney, supra note 1, at 728 n.20 (considering whether depreciation and backlog
represent statements concerning the present or the future).
217. In Folger Adam Company v. PMI Industries, Inc., 938 F.2d 1529, 1531 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112
U.S. 587 (1991), drafts of an offering memorandum prepared by an investment bank concerning the sale of
two subsidiaries had included unfavorable projections, which were removed from the final memorandum at
the parent corporation's request. The purchaser was advised before the purchase of an earnings estimate 38%
higher than the original estimate. The court stated:
[The defendants] argue that because the... projections were not compiled with "substantial
certainty," they were not material facts that needed to be disclosed in the course of the ...
transaction. Because [the plaintiff's] witness may be able to persuade a correctly instructed jury
that the ... projections were accurate statements of [the subsidiaries'] future that were inten-
tionally concealed, however, we cannot find that appellees' conduct was immaterial as a matter
of law.
Id. at 1534. The court's focus on whether the omitted projections were compiled with "substantial certainty"
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to have a reasonable basis for the projection, but is also understood to be presenting its
good faith, best estimate. Omission of a second, equally plausible estimate implicates
the same concerns as an express mischaracterization of an estimate, such as a failure to
state that an estimate represented a "best case." Each is in essence a claim that the
estimate or opinion was not properly described, and they differ solely in that one
breaches an implied description while the other breaches an express description. Each
demonstrates an intent to mislead."" Circumstances supporting the inference that a
change in an opinion was made in bad faith by showing a motive include that a report-
ing company is engaged in a proxy fight or that the company is making a securities
offering.
As noted above, scienter is an element of claims under Rule lOb-5 but not of
claims under section 11 of the 1933 Act.2"9 Where it is alleged that an estimate or
opinion was not disseminated in good faith, the proof required to prevail in the claim
should not depend on whether the claims are grounded on the 1933 Act or Rule lOb-5,
as bad faith represents an intent to deceive (which constitutes scienter).
It is difficult to state concisely those situations in which omission of the assump-
tions sufficiently indicates bad faith to warrant withholding application of the judicially
created safe harbor of the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine. Cases have presented examples
of circumstances in which assumptions should be disclosed. For material projections in
disclosure documents concerning operations without any prior operations, assumptions
concerning general economic factors, such as inflation, should be disclosed if they are
substantially more optimistic' ° than the most recent historical information. And the
corresponding impact on the estimate or opinion arising from that optimistic assumption
should be disclosed." Where assumptions relate to readily available economic infor-
is more appropriate in the context of determining whether a company should be required to disclose any pro-
jections. See generally Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 291-93 (7th Cir.) (holding that there
was no duty under Rule 10b-5 to include tentative earnings projections in a public letter issued in connection
with an unsolicited takeover that disclosed recently implemented programs to improve profitability and results
for the preceding nine months), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Garcia v. Cordova, 930 F.2d 826, 831
(10th Cir. 1991) (holding the statement by an investment bank that a stock value could be between $40 and
$100 per share, without disclosure of the basis for the figures, was too speculative and premature to be mate-
rial). The material, favorable revision of the projections, especially where coupled with circumstances demon-
strating an unusual benefit from favorable projections, should by itself be adequate to permit a jury to con-
clude that the favorable projections were made in bad faith (and should be actionable).
218. Compare Rand v. M/A-Corn, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 242, 258 (D. Mass. 1992) (denying the defendants'
motion for summary judgment with respect to claims founded on Rule lOb-5 concerning projections consis-
tent with the more favorable of two internal projections prepared by the defendants) with In re Donald J.
Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 543, 567 (D.N.J. 1992) (holding that no claim against an issuer that
included an appraisal in its prospectus could be based on the failure to disclose a second, less favorable ap-
praisal obtained by a predecessor in interest), aftd, 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993) and Morin v. Trupin, 809 F.
Supp. 1081, 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding claims under Rule lOb-5 were not pled with the specificity re-
quired by Rule 9(b) where an affidavit of a former employee of a defendant stated that a defendant "made
changes in the Assumptions used in compiling the Financial Projections [on which the claims were founded]
in order to make the... [o]ffering more marketable to his clients.").
219. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
220. In this context, the word "optimistic" refers to a beneficial impact on the projection.
221. Circumstances might objectively warrant estimates based on assumptions substantially different than
historical results, where recent events make historical information of less relevance. However, in those cir-
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mation, any substantial deviation from the historical information without quantitative
disclosure of the impact on the estimate or opinion arising from that deviation suggests
conscious omission. Thus, dissemination of such an estimate or opinion would meet the
falsity and scienter requirements of Rule lOb-5 as well as the falsity and, to the extent
applicable, the absence of due diligence elements of claims under section 11 or 12(2) of
the 1933 Act. Where a disclosure document contains projections based on these opti-
mistic assumptions, the incremental cost of disclosing the assumptions and the extent to
which they are optimistic is outweighed by the value of permitting persons analyzing
the securities to make an independent judgment concerning the likelihood that the as-
sumptions are warranted.m Mclnnis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc.,2' is a good example of such a case. The assumptions of revenues were based on
assumed inflation rates that were 50% to 100% (three to six percentage points) above
the rate most recently experienced. 24
Similarly, for companies that are just commencing operations, projections based on
undisclosed assumptions of sales or profitability greater than industry averages may be
misleading. However, the court affirmed the dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) of claims that a projection based on very optimistic assumptions
violated section 11 of the 1933 Act and Rule lOb-5 in In re Donald J. Trump Casino
Securities Litigation.' Failure to disclose that the assumptions are favorable does not
convey the sense that the company is relying on superior performance to achieve those
goals, and should be actionable.
Cases concerning projections prepared based on unreasonably optimistic assump-
tions may present circumstances in which the assumptions were selected negligently.
Thus, disclosure of estimates or opinions based on those assumptions might be action-
able under section 11 or 12(2) of the 1933 Act but may not meet the scienter require-
ment of Rule 1Ob-5.Y
cumstances, omission of the assumptions creates ambiguous disclosure, which should not be encouraged.
222. Even if the assumptions and their effect were disclosed, the estimate could be actionable if the as-
sumptions were unreasonably optimistic.
223. 706 F. Supp. 1355, 1358 (M.D. Tenn. 1989). Rule 9(b) presents plaintiffs with additional problems
in prosecuting claims in this context. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
224. The court held that this claim was not actionable as alleged, stating, "To state a claim, the plaintiffs
must allege that [the defendant] knew of certain facts that could not be reconciled with its prediction that
inflation rates would rise sharply ...." Mclnnis, 706 F. Supp. at 1359. The court's opinion does not state
whether the disclosure document stated that the assumed inflation rates exceeded the most recent historical
rates. This holding does not analyze the disclosure from the perspective of the recipients. If individuals read-
ing the disclosure would not understand that the projections were based on the optimistic general economic
assumptions, the disclosure is inadequate.
225. 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993). See supra notes 140-57 and accompanying text.
226. Because plaintiffs often allege claims under both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act, some courts have
analyzed both claims under the same standards. See, e.g., Krim v. BancTexas Group, Inc., 989 F.2d 1435,
1446 (5th Cir. 1993); In re Convergent Technologies Sec. Litig., 948 F.2d 507, 512 n.2. 517 (9th Cir. 1991)
(referring to the case as a "fraud-on-the-market" case, even though the claims alleged violation of both § 11
and Rule lOb-5); In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 543, 552 (D.N.J. 1992) ("Plaintiffs
are correct in stating that 'a projection that is issued without a reasonable basis is an untrue statement and
actionable under § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 if made knowingly or recklessly.' The same is true for section II
claims.") (citations omitted), aftid, 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993); Ciresi v. Citicorp, 782 F. Supp. 819, 822-23
(S.D.N.Y. 1991), aft'd, 956 F.2d 1161 (1992). To the extent an analysis of the materiality of and reliance on
1994]
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The Bespeaks Caution Doctrine also should be inapplicable to estimates that
are very sensitive to changes in the assumptions unless that fact is disclosed. 2' In that
context, disclosure of the sensitivity is not adequate without information giving some
sense of the magnitude of the sensitivity. Proper disclosure in that context would either
present a second set of projections based on alternative assumptions or indicate the
effect of a specified change in the assumptions. m Customary disclosure such as "re-
sults may vary significantly from that projected if the rates are higher or lower than
expected" does not convey information permitting independent analysis, and therefore
does not meet the objective of disclosure-to permit investors to make an independent
judgment of the value of the securities. However, the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine should
apply to estimates based on aggressive, reasonably selected, firm-specific assumptions if
the nature of the assumptions is prominently disclosed.2' The failure to disclose that
such an estimate is highly sensitive to changes in assumptions, however, might be ac-
tionable.'
Cases often arise involving claims against a third party whose report or opinion,
included in the relevant disclosure document, allegedly is based on unreasonable as-
sumptions provided by the issuer. These cases have primarily concerned tax opinions
and reports on projections or pro forma information."' Courts have held these parties
an opinion or estimate accompanied by cautionary language in a claim under Rule lOb-5 incorporates an
assessment of whether the opinion was disseminated recklessly (i.e., one test is applied to determine compli-
ance with the various elements), this treatment is inconsistent with the existence of varying elements of ac-
tions under the two Acts. Cf. In re VeriFone Sec. Litig., [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
97,820, at 98,071 (9th Cir. Nov. 17, 1993) ("Shareholders argue that the district court improperly 'lumped'
their claims under 11 of the '33 Act with their claims under 12(2) of the '33 Act and 10(b) of the '34 Act
(and Rule 10b-5 thereunder) .... Mhey maintain that a 'duty to disclose' analysis is irrelevant with respect
to 11 .... [We interpret the district court's discussion of a 'duty to disclose' as bearing on whether they
adequately allege a material misrepresentation or omission, a question common to all statutory provisions at
issue in this case.").
227. Such an omission was alleged in Nichols v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 706 F. Supp.
1309, 1348 n.18 (M.D. Tenn. 1989).
228. See generally Proposed Guides for Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Secu-
rities Act Release No. 5699, 41 Fed. Reg. 19,986, 19,987 (1976) ("In weighing the advantages and disadvan-
tages of disclosing projections and in determining the period and format of projections, management should
not be guided solely by its ability to forecast a single net income figure. Investors may be provided with
useful information by the presentation of ranges or alternative estimates based on various assumptions about
future events.").
229. Cf. O'Brien v. National Property Analysts Partners, 936 F.2d 674, 677 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussing a
complaint concerning a document disclosing assumptions of increased sales by tenants of the issuer, whose
revenues were based on those sales).
230. The nature of this type of estimate can yield circumstances in which the failure to know of its sensi-
tivity is not reasonable but does not rise to the level of reckless conduct. The culpability standard applies to
whether the sensitivity should have been known. If that information were known, its omission would be inten-
tional and therefore meet the requirements for liability under both §§ 11 and 12(2) of the 1933 Act as well as
under Rule lOb-5.
231. See, e.g., Moorhead v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 949 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1991);
Sable v. Southmark/Envicon Capital Corp., 819 F. Supp. 324, 335-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Griffin v. McNiff, 744
F. Supp. 1237, 1253-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affid, 996 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1993); C-L Alexanders Laing &
Cruickshank v. Goldfeld. 739 F. Supp. 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1990): Friedman v. Arizona World Nurseries Ltd. Part-
nership, 730 F. Supp. 521, 531-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Stevens v. Equidyne Extractive Indus. 1980, 694 F. Supp.
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not liable where their report or opinion was not based on reasonable assumptions, or
was based on extraordinarily favorable assumptions and the report was accompanied by
statements disclaiming responsibility for the assumptions. 2  Disclaimers such as the
firm "relied on assumptions without verifying the data" do not convey that the firm
might be recklessly disregarding the inappropriate selection of assumptions. These
courts have identified no reason why disclaimers that do not clearly explain that they
extend to reckless conduct or intentional misconduct should be construed to apply in
such cases,2 33 and are inconsistent with the policy of full and complete disclosure un-
derlying the federal securities laws.23
Conditioning application of the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine on disclosure of as-
sumptions underlying earnings estimates of companies with operating histories is more
complex. Estimates based on optimistic assumptions that would be actionable by them-
selves may not be actionable in the context of prior annual and quarterly reporting of
plans and expectations that could provide a context in which investors should under-
stand that assumptions are optimistic. At a minimum, where estimates are based on a
company's plans or on trends identified by the company, it is inconsistent for a compa-
ny to take the position that the plans or trends are insufficiently certain to be required to
be disclosed and then nevertheless release estimates based on those plans or trends.
D. Claims Implicating Mismanagement
In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green," the Supreme Court held that minority
shareholders did not have a cause of action under Rule lOb-5 for allegations that the
consideration to be received in a freeze-out merger was inadequate where the informa-
tion statement for the merger contained no omissions or misstatements.2 The court
stated: "Congress by § 10(b) did not seek to regulate transactions which constitute no
more than internal corporate mismanagement." '237 The Court distinguished cases "in
which the breaches of fiduciary duty held violative of Rule lOb-5 included some ele-
ment of deception."'
1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Andreo v. Friedlander, Gaines, Cohen, Rosenthal & Rosenberg, 651 F. Supp. 877 (D.
Conn. 1986).
232. See, e.g., McInnis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 1355, 1359 (M.D.
Tenn. 1989). But see Stevens. 694 F. Supp. at 1064 (holding that a tax opinion stating that it was "more likely
than not that the bulk of tax benefits... are allowable" was actionable even though the tax opinion stated
that it was based on facts supplied by the issuer).
233. Narrowly construing the scope of these disclaimers is also consistent with the judicial trend of nar-
rowly construing the scope of contractual waivers of negligence. Cf. 4 FOWLER V. HARPER Er AL., THE LAW
OF TORTS 251 (2d ed. 1986).
234. Policies that permit firms whose opinions or reports are included in disclosure documents to disclaim
liability for reckless conduct are also difficult to harmonize with the SEC's view that a registrant's indemnifi-
cation of officers and controlling persons for liability under the 1933 Act is unenforceable as against public
policy. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.510 (1993). The unenforceability of such indemnification reflects a belief that it
is improper to release an individual from liability for failure to fulfill a duty created by law to assure that
disclosure is not false or misleading.
235. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
236. Id. at 467, 474.
237. Id. at 479 (quoting Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971)).
238. Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 474-75.
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This doctrine has lead defendants to attempt to characterize undisclosed manage-
ment practices as mismanagement, which need not be disclosed. On this basis, courts
have held the following omissions, directly or indirectly relating to financial results,'
not to be actionable under the federal securities laws: that the company's rapid expan-
sion program was undertaken with "little or no meaningful information concerning the
question of whether [the company] could profitably expand";' that the company ex-
panded to businesses for which it did not have the ability and resources to manage
efficiently; that the company had inadequate procedures to identify expansion costs
and to control marketing costs;2 an absence of accounting controls and management
information systems necessary to assure accuracy of reported financial information;2
3
a delay in writing down an asset;' overstaffing for some types of employees coupled
with understaffing as to other types;us billing problems that delayed collections and
caused customer dissatisfaction;' that overhead was rising faster than planned;24
and that a heightened importance of marketing, as compared to historical competition
on the basis of cost, would disadvantage the issuer, which could not spend as much on
advertising as its competitors.' Courts have found the following actionable if ade-
quately supported by the facts: alleged reckless dissemination of financial statements
containing "errors in calculation";' failure to disclose problems with inventory levels
and production capacity utilization;' failure to disclose that the success of an issuer
depended on illegal marketing practices that violated consent orders," and dissemina-
tion of representations that quality control problems had been solved, with knowledge
239. This doctrine has been applied to disclosure not relating to financial results. See, e.g., Kas v. Finan-
cial Gen. Bankshares, Inc., 796 F.2d 508, 514-15 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that the doctrine does not permit
omissions of material conflicts of interest, whether or not the conflicts breach fiduciary duties); Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 289 (7th Cir.) (holding that the doctrine applies to a policy of contesting
all acquisition overtures, regardless of their benefits to shareholders), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981);
Craftmatic Sec. Litig. v. Kraftsow, 890 F.2d 628, 640 (3d Cir. 1989) (rejecting application of the doctrine to a
failure to disclose that the company's marketing practices resulted in an unusually high number of customer
complaints). See also In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 543, 556 (D.N.J. 1992) ("Cer-
tainly management is not required to offer investments pursuant to a prospectus which disparages the very
viability of that investment."), aft'd, 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993). Issuers should not be required to use particu-
larly inflammatory or derogatory language in disclosing adverse information. Id. at 559. Cf. Financial General
Bankshares, 796 F.2d at 517. However, permitting companies not to disclose negative information is contrary
to the full disclosure scheme of the federal securities laws.
240. Craftmatic, 890 F.2d at 632 n.5, 640.
241. Id. at 633 n.5.
242. Id.
243. Id.; In re United Telecommunications, Inc., Sec. Litig., 781 F. Supp. 696, 699-700 (D. Kan. 1991).
244. Greenberg v. Howtek, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 1181, 1187 (D.N.H. 1992); United Telecommunications,
781 F. Supp. at 696-700; see also supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
245. United Telecommunications, 781 F. Supp. at 698, 700.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 699-700.
249. In re American Travellers Corp. Sec. Litig., 806 F. Supp. 547, 551 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
250. Robbins v. Moore Medical Corp., 788 F. Supp. 179, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
251. Craftmatic Sec. Litig. v. Kraftsow, 890 F.2d 628, 640 (3d Cir. 1989).
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of their falsity. 2
Just as it is not appropriate for an issuer to fail to disclose material information on
the basis that the information is reflected in a disclosed opinion or estimate, material
factual information should not be omitted on the basis that the facts arose from mis-
management. Where financial statements are not accurate because the issuer has inade-
quate management information systems or accounting controls, the disclosure's inaccu-
racy should be within the scope of the federal securities laws, whether the inaccuracy
arises from intentional misconduct, fraud, or negligence. Moreover, just as disclosure of
projections creates an implied representation that they are made with a reasonable basis,
the release of actual financial results implies that they have been prepared with a rea-
sonable basis. The failure to disclose that actual financial results have been prepared
without a reasonable basis also should be actionable. This approach is consistent with
the obligation to disclose that an independent accountant recently advised a company
that the internal controls necessary to develop reliable financial statements do not exist
if the accountant resigned or was dismissed, 3 the expectation being that the accoun-
tant will resign if the internal controls are not satisfactorily revised.
Similarly, a company should be required to exercise in a reasonable manner its
judgment in determining whether to write down assets. Those determinations involve
judgments similar to those underlying projections.' The ongoing reporting require-
ments of the 1934 Act and the requirements of the 1933 Act obligate companies to
exercise that judgment at specified times. The regulatory scheme created under sections
11 and 12(2) of the 1933 Act reflects a determination that the benefits to investors from
requiring judgments formed in preparing disclosure to be exercised reasonably outweigh
unwarranted burdens on issuers. This approach should be applied consistently in the
context of the timing of write-downs. Similarly, reckless exercise of that judgment
should be actionable under Rule lOb-5.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The Safe Harbor represented an experiment by the SEC aimed at encouraging
wider dissemination of estimates and opinions. The Bespeaks Caution Doctrine can be
viewed as a judicial extension of the principles embodied in the Safe Harbor in the
absence of significant revision of the Safe Harbor since the SEC's first tentative regula-
tory actions in the field. The implementation of the Safe Harbor has not fostered dis-
semination of an excessive number of unwarranted projections. This experience supports
extension of the liability limits for estimates or opinions made in good faith and with a
reasonable basis under the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine to statements contained in offer-
ing documents generally circulated to prospective purchasers, whether with respect to
252. Steiner v. Unitrode Corp., 834 F. Supp. 40, 45 (D. Mass. 1993).
253. Item 304(a)(1)(v)(A), Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.304(a)(1)(v)(A) (1993).
254. Cf Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 281 (3d Cir.) ("There is nothing unique about repre-
sentations and omissions regarding loan loss reserves that removes them from the purview of the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992); accord In re Wells Fargo Sec.
Litig., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,007, at 98,252-53 (9th Cir. Dec. 29, 1993); cf. supra notes
118-26 and accompanying text.
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registered or unregistered offerings, and to statements underlying actions asserting viola-
tion of Rule lOb-5 relying on a fraud-on-the-market theory. In addition, the reported
cases have not demonstrated any reason to restrict this approach to estimates or opin-
ions concerning financial statement items.
However, the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine had its origins in a case decided before
the meaning of "scienter" was fully developed. The failure of Pollin to place the doc-
trine in that context has been perpetuated by courts that extended the doctrine to causes
of action under the 1933 Act without consideration of the absence of a requirement of
scienter under section 11 or 12(2) of the 1933 Act. The difficulties that plaintiffs have
pursuing meritorious claims warrant application of the doctrine--especially as to claims
of which scienter is an element--only after some discovery has been permitted. In this
context, a reasonable basis for an estimate or opinion requires an absence of negligence.
For claims under section 10 of the 1934 Act, plaintiffs have to prove the additional
element of scienter. As a result of the varying elements of claims under the 1933 Act
and the 1934 Act, opinions or estimates may be actionable under the 1933 Act but not
under the 1934 Act. In addition, neither disclosure of an estimate or opinion nor dis-
semination of mere cautionary language should discharge the obligation to disclose
material underlying information.
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